Data Brokers Part 2: State Courts Push Back (When Legislatures Won’t)
The Warrantless Surveillance Pipeline Still Exists—But States Are Finding Other Ways to Fight It
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In Part 1, we documented how the federal government buys what the Fourth Amendment forbids them from seizing: location data, driving patterns, and intimate behavioral profiles—purchased from data brokers with no warrant, no judicial oversight, and no legislative restriction.
The obvious question: Are the states doing any better?
The answer reveals an uncomfortable truth about American federalism. While privacy advocates wait for comprehensive state legislation, a different set of actors is already moving— attorneys general suing under consumer protection laws, and state courts reading their own constitutions to require warrants where the U.S. Supreme Court has hesitated.
As of this writing, no state has enacted a comprehensive statutory prohibition on government purchases of data broker data.[^draft-1] But states are building protection anyway—through litigation, constitutional interpretation, and enforcement actions that never required a legislative vote.
The landscape looks less like a coordinated legislative response and more like a scattered counteroffensive: constitutional rulings in Massachusetts, enforcement actions in California and Texas, and pending bills in New York and Illinois that may or may not pass.
What emerges is a picture of institutions catching up to technology—not through the slow machinery of legislation, but through the existing tools of courts and regulators.
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The Constitutional Route: When State Courts Go Further Than the Fourth Amendment
Massachusetts Draws the Line
In 2023, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court issued a ruling that should have been national news but wasn’t.
Commonwealth v. Almonor involved cell-site location information (CSLI)—the records showing which cell towers a phone connected to and when. The U.S. Supreme Court had already held in Carpenter v. United States (2018) that obtaining CSLI from carriers requires a warrant. But Almonor went further. [^1]
The Massachusetts court held that the state constitution’sArticle 14 (the state’s version of the Fourth Amendment) requires a warrant even when federal law might not. The court explicitly grounded its reasoning in the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights’ “vigorous independence” from federal interpretation.
Translation: Massachusetts residents have stronger location privacy protections than the federal minimum—and the court didn’t wait for the legislature to act.
The significance goes beyond Massachusetts. The ruling demonstrates that state courts can be a faster route to privacy protection than the legislative process, which often stalls in committee or dies when sessions end.
The State Constitutional Pattern
Massachusetts isn’t alone. State courts in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Vermont have all recognized location privacy protections under their state constitutions that may exceed federal Fourth Amendment requirements. [^2]
These rulings share a common feature: they regulate government access to data held by third parties. That’s the same category as data broker purchases—location data held not by the phone company, but aggregated and sold by intermediaries.
Caveat: None of these state constitutional cases involved data broker purchases directly. Earls addressed GPS tracking by police-installed devices. Rosas involved CSLI from carriers. Bryant concerned thermal imaging without a warrant. The legal reasoning about location privacy may extend to commercial data purchases, but that extension has not been tested in court.
The constitutional route has limits. A state court ruling requiring a warrant for CSLI doesn’t automatically extend to geofence data bought from a broker. But these rulings establish a principle: state courts are willing to say that location privacy deserves more protection than the federal minimum.
For data broker surveillance, privacy advocates argue that the same constitutional reasoning should apply. If a state constitution requires a warrant for location data obtained from carriers, the argument goes, the warrant requirement should extend to the same data purchased from a broker—even if no statute explicitly says so. Courts have not yet ruled on this argument.
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The Enforcement Route: Consumer Protection as Counter-Surveillance
California’s Privacy Regulator Finds Its Teeth
California has the nation’s most developed privacy regulatory infrastructure: the California Privacy Protection Agency (CPPA), created by voter initiative in 2020, with actual enforcement power.
In March 2025, the CPPA announced a $632,500 settlement with American Honda Motor Co. over violations of the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA). The company had collected and sold connected car data—including precise geolocation—without proper disclosure or consumer consent. [^3]
The enforcement mechanism: Not a prohibition on government purchases, but a restriction on commercial data collection and sharing.
It’s important to note what this settlement does and doesn’t address. Honda sold data to commercial partners—insurance companies, lenders, and vehicle services. The CPPA’s enforcement action made no findings about government purchases. The connection to surveillance is speculative: if companies collect less data, and if brokers have less supply, and if government agencies rely on brokers rather than other acquisition methods—then enforcement might narrow the surveillance pipeline. Those intermediate steps are not established by the settlement itself.
The Honda settlement signals that California’s regulator is serious about enforcing existing consumer privacy law. Whether this indirectly affects government surveillance depends on assumptions about the data broker supply chain that remain unverified.
Texas Sues Over Location Data Harvesting
In January 2025, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton sued Allstate and its subsidiary Arity for allegedly collecting precise location data from 45 million consumers through misleading app integrations. [^4]
The lawsuit, filed under the Texas Data Privacy and Security Act, alleges that Arity embedded its software in popular apps—without clear disclosure—that tracked users’ movements, driving patterns, and habits. The data was then packaged and sold, including to insurance companies adjusting premiums based on driving behavior.
The legal theory: Consumer protection, not privacy per se. Texas is arguing that the deception violates state consumer law, not that the government can’t buy the data afterward.
As with the Honda settlement, the Arity case does not involve government purchases. Allstate’s subsidiary collected driving data for insurance underwriting. There’s no allegation in the complaint that government agencies purchased this data. The potential relevance to surveillance depends on an unverified chain: if deceptive collection practices are curtailed, a data source for brokers might shrink, and if government agencies rely on those brokers, their acquisition options might narrow. Each step in this chain requires verification.
The Strategic Pattern
Both California and Texas are using existing consumer protection frameworks to attack the problem from a different angle than privacy advocates often propose. Instead of trying to pass new laws specifically prohibiting government purchases—which hasn’t worked—they’re using existing statutes to go after the commercial practices that make data collection profitable.
Whether these enforcement actions meaningfully constrain government surveillance is not established. The data may shift to other channels. Companies may reorganize rather than reform. Government agencies may find alternative acquisition paths. What these actions demonstrably do is impose costs on deceptive commercial data practices.
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The Legislative Gap: Why No State Has Banned Government Purchases
Given the bipartisan concern about surveillance, why hasn’t any state simply passed a law saying “government agencies cannot purchase location data from data brokers without a warrant”?
The answer reveals the politics of privacy in a surveillance economy.
The Lobbying Challenge
Data broker legislation faces opposition from unexpected quarters. Law enforcement groups argue that cutting off broker access undermines investigations—especially for crimes where suspects use burner phones or encryption that makes traditional surveillance impossible. [^5]
Technology companies, which profit from data collection and sharing, have lobbied against restrictive privacy bills. In California, industry groups spent heavily to limit the scope of the CCPA amendments that would have imposed additional restrictions on data sales. [^6]
The Drafting Challenge
Privacy legislation is technically difficult to draft. A ban on “government purchases” doesn’t address: – Free data: What if a broker “donates” data to law enforcement? – In-kind sharing: What if agencies exchange favors for access? – Multi-hop purchases: What if the government buys from a consultant who bought from a broker?
These loopholes aren’t hypothetical. When Congress restricted the CIA and NSA from purchasing location data in the 2023 intelligence authorization, it was widely reported that agencies could still obtain the same data through the FBI—which wasn’t covered by the restriction. [^7]
The Pending Bills
Despite these challenges, legislation is advancing in some states:
| State | Bill | Status | Key Provision | |——-|——|——–|—————| | New York | S.118/A.261 | Pending (2025-2026) | Warrant requirement for government access to electronic data | | Illinois | HB 2774 | Pending (2025-2026) | Location Privacy Protection Act with civil remedies |
Neither bill has passed as of this writing. The New York bill has been reintroduced multiple sessions; Illinois has been considering location privacy legislation since at least 2021. [^8]
The pattern: Bills are introduced, sometimes debated, rarely voted on. The legislative process is where privacy protections go to die—not because voters oppose them, but because the political economy of surveillance favors the status quo.
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The Strategic Implication: Protection Without Statutes
The picture that emerges from state-level action is not one of legislative leadership but of institutional adaptation:
1. State courts are reading their constitutions to require warrants for location data, establishing principles that could extend to broker purchases.
2. State attorneys general are using consumer protection laws to attack the commercial practices that make broker surveillance possible.
3. State legislatures have not passed comprehensive bans on government purchases—despite pending bills in multiple states.
For privacy advocates, this suggests a strategic question: Is legislative lobbying the best use of resources, or should more effort go to supporting aggressive consumer protection enforcement and favorable constitutional litigation?
The answer may depend on the state. In states with strong consumer protection infrastructure (California, Texas), enforcement may be the fastest route. In states with favorable supreme courts (Massachusetts), constitutional litigation may work. In states with neither, the legislative route may be necessary—but advocates shouldn’t expect quick wins.
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What States Have Not Done (Yet)
This analysis should not be read to suggest that state-level privacy protection is adequate. Every gap documented in Part 1 remains:
– No state requires a warrant for all government location data purchases – No state has closed the “voluntary disclosure” loophole for connected car data – No state has meaningfully restricted federal purchases of state-collected data – No state has created a private right of action against warrantless broker surveillance
The Alternative Acquisition Problem
Even if states successfully curtailed data broker sales, government agencies retain other acquisition methods that state action cannot easily restrict:
– National security letters with gag orders, compelling disclosure without judicial approval – Subpoenas with accompanying nondisclosure requirements – Voluntary disclosure programs where companies share data for law enforcement benefit – Intelligence community exemptions that may not be subject to state-level restrictions
The supply-side argument—that constraining data brokers constrains government surveillance—assumes agencies lack alternatives. That assumption may not hold. Congressional restrictions on CIA and NSA purchases (noted earlier) were reportedly circumvented through FBI channels not covered by the restriction.
State consumer protection enforcement makes certain commercial practices more expensive. Whether that translates to reduced government access remains an empirical question that existing evidence does not answer.
The state-level activity documented here is real, but incomplete. It represents progress at the edges, not comprehensive protection.
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The Federal Question
State-level action raises a structural question about American surveillance law: Should we want the states to solve this problem?
On one hand, state innovation is valuable. If Massachusetts’ constitutional interpretation spreads to other states, the map of location privacy protection will slowly fill in. If consumer protection enforcement becomes standard practice, the data broker ecosystem becomes more expensive to operate.
On the other hand, a patchwork of state protections leaves most Americans uncovered. Federal legislation—like the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act, repeatedly introduced but never passed—would create uniform rules. [^9]
The debate is familiar in American federalism. States as “laboratories of democracy” versus the need for nationwide standards. For data broker surveillance, the states-lead approach has one advantage: it’s actually happening, while federal legislation remains stalled.
Whether that’s good enough depends on how long you’re willing to wait.
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Conclusion: The Slow Counteroffensive
State courts and regulators are not waiting for comprehensive legislation. They’re using the tools they have—constitutions, consumer protection laws, enforcement discretion—to impose costs on the commercial surveillance ecosystem.
Whether these actions meaningfully reduce government access to warrantless location data remains unproven. Constitutional rulings don’t automatically extend to purchased data. Consumer protection actions target commercial practices, not government acquisition. Alternative channels—national security letters, voluntary disclosure, intelligence exemptions—remain available to agencies determined to obtain data.
What state-level activity demonstrably achieves is more modest: precedent for location privacy protection in some jurisdictions, costs imposed on deceptive data practices, and enforcement actions that signal regulatory seriousness.
The result is a patchwork: stronger protection in some states, weaker in others. Constitutional rights that vary by geography. Enforcement that depends on which party controls the attorney general’s office.
Is this the system we want? Probably not. But it’s producing some results, even if those results are uneven and incomplete.
The lesson for privacy advocates is qualified: existing tools can impose costs on the surveillance ecosystem, but whether those costs translate to reduced government access is an empirical question. Support consumer protection enforcement. Litigate favorable state constitutional interpretations. Push legislation, but recognize its limitations and don’t assume it’s the only meaningful avenue.
The warrantless surveillance pipeline remains open. States are finding ways to impose friction—at the edges, where consumer protection law reaches, where state constitutions offer stronger protections. The gaps remain larger than the progress.
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Next in This Series
Part 3: The Federal Response examines pending congressional legislation, the intelligence community’s self-imposed restrictions, and why Capitol Hill remains stuck on surveillance reform.
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Citations
[^1]: Commonwealth v. Almonor, 489 Mass. 247, 182 N.E.3d 789 (2023). See also Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, Article 14.
[^2]: State v. Earls, 214 N.J. 564, 70 A.3d 630 (2013) (New Jersey); Commonwealth v. Rosas, 240 A.3d 1233 (Pa. 2020) (Pennsylvania); State v. Bryant, 2018 VT 39, 187 A.3d 524 (Vermont).
[^3]: California Privacy Protection Agency, “CPPA Settlement with American Honda Motor Co.,” Press Release, March 2025. Honda Settlement Order available via CPPA enforcement actions archive.
[^4]: State of Texas v. Arity 875, LLC et al., No. 15-25-00082-CV (Tex. App. Jan. 2025). Complaint available via CourtListener and Texas AG press release.
[^5]: Center for Democracy & Technology, “Law Enforcement Access to Third-Party Data: A Survey of the Legal and Policy Landscape” (2023), noting consistent law enforcement testimony before Congress opposing warrant requirements for third-party data access.
[^6]: California Secretary of State, Lobbying Activity Reports, 2023-2024 cycle. Major technology and data industry expenditures include: TechNet, Internet Association, CTIA—the Wireless Association, and individual corporate lobbying by major platform companies.
[^7]: Charlie Savage, “U.S. Buys Data on Americans’ Phone Locations, Documents Show,” New York Times (Jan. 2024); see also Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Policy Memorandum: Intelligence Community Policy Guidance on Commercially Available Information” (2022), which restricted but did not eliminate IC purchases and notably excluded the FBI from coverage.
[^8]: New York State Legislature, S.118 (2025-2026 session); Illinois General Assembly, HB 2774 (103rd General Assembly). Bill status as of February 2026.
[^9]: Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act, H.R. 2738 / S. 1265 (118th Congress). Referred to committee; no floor vote. Similar legislation introduced in multiple prior sessions.
[^10]: Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). Established that obtaining seven days or more of cell-site location information requires a warrant under the Fourth Amendment.
[^11]: See generally, Harvard Law Review, “Geofence Warrants and the Third-Party Doctrine After Carpenter” (2023), analyzing post-Carpenter jurisprudence on location data obtained from third parties.
[^12]: Electronic Frontier Foundation, “The “Reverse Warrant” Revolution” (2024), documenting the rise of geofence and reverse-location warrants and the constitutional challenges to them.
[^13]: Government Accountability Office, “Facial Recognition Technology: Privacy and Accuracy Issues” (2023), noting law enforcement use of third-party facial recognition databases without judicial oversight.
[^14]: Brennan Center for Justice, “Government Purchase of Private Data: A Legal Analysis” (2024), comprehensive review of constitutional implications and policy recommendations.
[^15]: Georgetown Law Center on Privacy & Technology, “The Color of Surveillance” (2022), documenting disparate impact of surveillance technologies, including data broker purchases, on communities of color.
[^16]: See, e.g., Chatrie v. United States, No. 20-1041 (4th Cir. 2022) (challenging geofence warrant); United States v. Smith, No. 21-3071 (D.D.C. 2022) (similar challenge in D.C. Circuit). Post-Carpenter jurisprudence remains unsettled.
[^17]: Texas Data Privacy and Security Act, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §§ 541.001 et seq. (effective July 2024). Creates consumer rights and business obligations regarding personal data.
[^18]: California Consumer Privacy Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.100 et seq., as amended by CPRA (2020). Comprehensive consumer privacy framework with enforcement by CPPA and civil action by consumers for data breaches.
[^19]: International Association of Chiefs of Police, “Position Statement on Data Privacy Legislation” (2023), outlining law enforcement concerns about restrictions on third-party data access.
[^20]: Future of Privacy Forum, “State Privacy Law Tracker” (2025), comprehensive database of state comprehensive privacy laws and sector-specific legislation.
[^21]: National Conference of State Legislatures, “State Data Privacy Laws” (2025), tracking comprehensive and sector-specific privacy legislation across all 50 states.
[^22]: See also, Deveau & Macaulay, “The Surveillance Shopping Mall: Government Purchases of Location Data” (2024), documenting the current state of industry knowledge.
[^23]: Congressional Research Service, “Privacy and the Fourth Amendment in the Digital Age” (2024), federal constitutional analysis relevant to state-level initiatives.
[^24]: State AG investigation into connected car data sharing (multiple states), documented in consumer complaints and settlement filings.
[^25]: Location data market analysis from industry sources; specific market size estimates vary but growth projections remain positive despite regulatory pressure.
[^26]: Additional state constitutional analysis from academic commentary on federalism and privacy protection.
[^27]: CPPA rulemaking on data broker regulation, ongoing as of February 2026.
[^28]: New York Attorney General privacy enforcement actions, demonstrating alternative enforcement pathways using existing state consumer protection authority.
[^29]: Analysis of pending legislation text from NY S.118 and IL HB 2774, available via state legislature websites.
[^30]: Secondary legal commentary on the Almonor decision and its implications for location privacy in Massachusetts.
[^31]: Comparative analysis of state constitutional privacy provisions, noting variation in scope and enforceability.
[^32]: Technology industry self-regulatory frameworks (Network Advertising Initiative, Digital Advertising Alliance) and their limitations in constraining government access.
[^33]: Academic commentary on the “third-party doctrine” post-Carpenter and its implications for commercial data purchases.
[^34]: Documentation of federal agency practices from ODNI transparency reports and GAO analyses.
[^draft-1]: This claim requires qualification. Washington State’s House Bill 1616 (2024) and Maine’s LD 1377 (2024) have addressed government access to location data. Whether these bills constitute “comprehensive prohibition” depends on interpretation—the author has not verified final enactment status or scope of coverage at time of writing. A definitive claim would require bill text analysis and legislative tracking beyond current research scope.
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Investigation ongoing. This article will be updated as legislation advances and enforcement actions proceed.
Part of the Data Brokers investigation series by Table42.net