Part 3 of “The Newsprint Vultures” — The leaked financial documents that proved Alden’s newspapers were profitable all along.
The spreadsheet that changed everything
In May 2018, Ken Doctor published a story in Nieman Lab that upended the narrative about Alden Global Capital. He had obtained a leaked internal financial document — a spreadsheet showing Digital First Media’s fiscal year 2017 performance.[1]
The numbers were astonishing:
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Revenue | $939 million |
| Operating expenses | $780 million |
| Operating profit | $159 million |
| Operating margin | 17% |
A 17% operating margin. For context, the newspaper industry average was 6-10%. The industry had been in decline since 2005, with advertising revenue falling from $49 billion to $14 billion. Alden wasn’t losing money. It was making more profit per dollar than almost any other newspaper company in America.[2]
The document revealed something else: in the Philadelphia suburbs, DFM was achieving 30% operating margins. This in a building described by employees as mold-infested and rat-infested — a building Alden had extracted rent from while refusing basic maintenance.[3]
The paradox had a name. Alden’s newspapers weren’t failing. They were being harvested.
The cost-cutting timeline
The profitability wasn’t accidental. It was engineered through a deliberate, aggressive cost-cutting campaign that outpaced anything in the industry.
2012-2017: The Great Hollowing
Between 2012 and 2017, DFM cut 52% of its newsroom workforce:[4]
| Year | Newsroom Staff |
|---|---|
| 2012 | 1,766 |
| 2017 | 849 |
| Reduction | 917 workers (52%) |
The rate of destruction was double the industry average. While other newspaper owners were cutting, Alden was cutting at twice the speed.
Bay Area News Group: A Case Study
The Bay Area News Group cluster — the San Jose Mercury News, Oakland Tribune, and other papers — showed the pattern clearly:[5]
| Metric | Before | After | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Staff | ~380 | ~160 | -58% |
| Profit | $20M | $40M | +100% |
Doubling profit while cutting more than half the staff. The equation was brutal: reduce costs immediately, extract the difference before revenue declines caught up.
The siphon: where the money went
If the newspapers were profitable, where was the money going? A lawsuit by minority shareholder Solus Alternative Asset Management provided answers.[6]
InvestmentCO: The Secret Subsidiary
DFM had created a secretive subsidiary called “Investment Holdings LLP” — referred to internally as InvestmentCO. The subsidiary’s purpose wasn’t to invest in journalism. It was to siphon newspaper revenue into Alden’s other bets.
According to the Solus lawsuit:
- $225 million credit facility established
- Funds flowed to Alden external investments, not newspaper operations
- $158 million invested in Fred’s Pharmacy — a drugstore chain that later went bankrupt
- €70 million invested in Greek debt instruments
The lawsuit alleged that Alden was using newspaper profits to fund high-risk investments unrelated to journalism. When those investments failed — as Fred’s did — newspaper workers paid the price through job cuts while Alden’s portfolio took the losses.[7]
The Pension Connection
The Solus lawsuit also revealed the pension transfer covered in Part 2:
- $248.5 million in pension assets diverted to Alden hedge funds
- Management fees generated on those assets
- Risk transferred to workers, profits retained by Alden
The pattern was consistent: extract from every available source — operating profits, real estate, pension funds — and direct the money to Alden’s broader investment portfolio.
The real estate extraction machine
While DFM was achieving 17% operating margins from journalism, Alden was simultaneously extracting value through its real estate arm, Twenty Lake Holdings.[8]
The Property Portfolio:
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Properties owned | 180+ |
| Square footage | 2.3 million |
| States covered | 29 |
Twenty Lake Holdings existed to acquire newspaper buildings from DFM at book value, then sell or lease them back at market rates. The newspapers paid rent on buildings they used to own.
The Orange County Register Example:
When Alden purchased the Orange County Register out of bankruptcy, the real estate was part of the deal:[9]
- Purchase price: $50 million (2016)
- Real estate sale: $34 million
- Recoupment: 68% of purchase price returned through real estate alone
The newspaper continued to operate — but now it was a tenant in its own building, paying rent to Alden.
This was the “double extraction”: newspapers generated operating profit while their real estate was stripped and sold.
The Solus lawsuit
In March 2018, Solus Alternative Asset Management — itself a hedge fund, but a minority shareholder in DFM — sued Alden.[10]
The Allegations:
- Alden funneled newspaper profits into failed investments unrelated to media
- DFM withheld financial records from shareholders to hide the transfers
- The Fred’s Pharmacy investment ($158 million) was a disaster that newspaper profits subsidized
- Alden charged management fees to DFM for “services” that consisted of extracting value
The Irony:
Solus wasn’t suing because it cared about journalism. It was suing because it wanted its share of the extraction. But the lawsuit nonetheless exposed the mechanism.
Alden’s response was to invoke a right it had previously opposed: giving shareholders a say in management decisions. When Solus demanded board representation, Alden restructured to maintain control.[11]
The lawsuit illuminated what workers had suspected: DFM was profitable, but the profits weren’t reinvested. They were extracted.
What the margins revealed
The 17% operating margin wasn’t a bug. It was the strategy.
The Newspaper Math:
Traditional newspaper owners treated margins as a byproduct of quality journalism: invest in newsrooms, attract readers, sell advertising, generate profit.
Alden inverted the equation: cut newsrooms, extract cost savings, generate profits immediately, direct those profits to Alden’s investment portfolio.
Why Competitors Couldn’t Match It:
Most newspaper owners still believed in the product. They cut costs reluctantly, hoping to preserve enough quality to maintain readership. Alden had no such attachment.
Heath Freeman, DFM’s president, famously said the company would consider selling if “somebody values these assets more than we do.”[12] But the point was: nobody could value them more. Alden had extracted so much value that the remaining asset — a hollowed-out newspaper with no building, skeleton staff, and stripped pension — was worth almost nothing to anyone else.
The workers’ view
The leaked financials confirmed what workers had been saying for years.
Denver Post staff letter (April 2018):
“We call on Alden Global Capital to sell The Denver Post to owners who will support good journalism in the community… If Alden is not willing to do good journalism here, it should sell The Post to owners who will.”[13]
Fifty-five of the 70 remaining newsroom employees signed the letter. They knew the company was profitable. They knew the cuts weren’t necessary. They knew the money was going somewhere else.
The leaked spreadsheet proved it.
The resolution
The paradox was never a paradox. The newspapers were profitable because Alden made them profitable — through cost-cutting that destroyed their long-term viability while generating short-term returns.
The model:
- Acquire newspaper at distressed price
- Strip real estate and pension assets
- Cut newsroom staff at 2x industry rate
- Generate operating margins of 15-20%
- Direct profits to Alden investment portfolio
- Repeat until newspaper is a shell
This wasn’t a newspaper company. It was a hedge fund that happened to own newspapers — and treated them as extraction vehicles rather than civic institutions.
What comes next
Part 4: The Democracy Toll — What happens to communities when local news disappears.
The 52% newsroom cuts weren’t just numbers. They represented journalists who uncovered corruption, covered city council meetings, investigated local businesses. What happens to communities when those eyes close?
Notes
- Doctor, Ken, “Alden Global Capital’s ‘jaw-dropping’ profits show that its newspapers aren’t just dying — they’re being harvested,” Nieman Lab, May 2018. https://www.niemanlab.org/2018/05/new-documents-show-alden-global-capitals-newspapers-are-dying-but-still-generating-jaw-dropping-profits/
- Doctor, Ken, Nieman Lab, May 2018. Industry comparison based on publicly reported newspaper operating margins.
- DFMworkers.org, reports on Philadelphia suburban newspaper building conditions.
- Jacobson, Savannah, “The most feared owner in American journalism looks set to take some of its greatest assets,” Columbia Journalism Review, June 11, 2020. https://www.cjr.org/special_report/alden-global-capital-medianews-tribune-company.php
- Point Reyes Light, report on Bay Area News Group staffing cuts, 2025.
- Solus Alternative Asset Management lawsuit against Alden Global Capital, reported in CNBC, 2018.
- CNBC, “Denver Post reporters vs ‘vulture capitalist’ hedge fund Alden,” June 16, 2018. https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/16/denver-post-reporters-vs-vulture-capitalist-hedge-fund-alden.html
- DFMworkers.org, “Alden Global’s friends in high places.” https://dfmworkers.org/alden-globals-friends-in-high-places/
- Poynter Institute, “Tampa Bay Times sells land to Alden real estate affiliate,” related reporting on Orange County Register acquisition.
- Solus Alternative Asset Management v. Alden Global Capital, filed March 2018, Delaware Court of Chancery.
- CNBC, 2018.
- Heath Freeman interview, cited in multiple reports, approximate quote.
- Denver Post staff open letter to readers, April 2018. Published in multiple outlets including The Denver Post and Columbia Journalism Review.
This article is part of the “Newsprint Vultures” series, investigating the financial destruction of local journalism. Part 4 examines the democracy toll when local news disappears.