A Proposed Framework
Part 7 of “The Tree of Liberty’s Roots: Repairing What Is Rotten”
Throughout this series, we have examined structural reforms to American democracy. We have ranked them by impact and feasibility. We have identified the central dilemma: the reforms with the highest democratic impact have the highest barriers.
The question is not whether reform is necessary. The question is whether reform is possible—and if so, under what conditions.
This final part proposes a strategic framework for navigating the reform dilemma. There is no single solution. There is no magic bullet. There are choices about what to pursue now, what to defer, and how to prepare for the possibility that structural change may come—whether reformers want it or not.
Defining Democratic Impact
Throughout this series, we have assessed reforms by “democratic impact.” The term deserves definition.
Democratic impact refers to the degree to which a reform makes government more responsive to citizen preferences—through voting, representation, accountability, or influence. The metric is necessarily judgment-based, but the elements are specific:
1. Majoritarianism: Does the reform make government more responsive to majority preference? The Electoral College fails this test—two of the last six presidents lost the popular vote.[^1] The Senate provides dramatic malapportionment—Wyoming and California have equal representation despite population differences of over 60:1.[^2]
2. Representation: Does the reform make government more representative of the population’s composition? The House, capped at 435 members since 1929, provides representation ratios that dilute individual votes compared to peer democracies.[^3]
3. Accountability: Does the reform make elected officials more accountable for their actions? Impeachment, as this series showed, has become effectively partisan rather than genuinely accountability-focused.[^4]
4. Inclusion: Does the reform expand participation to excluded or underrepresented groups? Voter suppression, felony disenfranchisement, and ballot access restrictions affect this element.[^5]
5. Legitimacy: Does the reform increase citizens’ perception that the system is fair and their participation matters? Declining trust in government suggests this element is under strain.[^6]
These elements sometimes conflict. Reforms that improve majoritarianism (pure direct democracy) may reduce inclusion (minority rights). Reforms that improve representation (proportional voting) may reduce accountability (coalition governments). The ranking in this series reflects judgment about which reforms would improve the overall democratic character of the system, acknowledging that trade-offs exist.
The Two-Phase Framework
We can distinguish reforms by whether they require constitutional amendment—whether they face statutory barriers or constitutional barriers, legal barriers or political barriers.
Phase 1: The Statutory Toolkit
These reforms can be implemented through legislation without constitutional amendment. They have varying degrees of political difficulty, but the legal barriers are surmountable:
Ranked-Choice Voting: States and cities can implement RCV through legislation or ballot initiatives. Maine and Alaska have adopted RCV for federal elections; over 50 jurisdictions use some form of RCV.[^7] No constitutional barrier exists.
Open Primaries: State legislatures can adopt open or nonpartisan primaries. California and Washington use top-two primaries; Alaska uses top-four with RCV.[^8] The process requires political will, not constitutional amendment.
House Expansion: The 435-member cap is statutory, not constitutional. Congress could repeal the Permanent Apportionment Act of 1929 through ordinary legislation.[^9] The Reapportionment Act of 1929 froze House size; a new statute could change it.
Democracy Vouchers: Cities and states can implement voucher programs. Seattle’s program, enacted in 2015, provides vouchers to residents for campaign contributions and has been used in multiple election cycles.[^10]
Lobbying Reform with Enforcement: Congress can extend cooling-off periods and strengthen disclosure requirements. The current one-year cooling-off period could be extended to two or five years through statute.[^11]
Citizen Assemblies (Advisory): States and Congress can create advisory citizen assemblies on specific questions, following the Irish model. The assemblies are advisory and require no constitutional amendment.[^12]
ICAC-Style Independent Commissions: States can create anti-corruption commissions with genuine independence, following models from other democracies. The legal framework exists; the challenge is securing independence from political interference.[^13]
These reforms produce moderate impact. They improve the system but do not transform its fundamental structure. They address symptoms—campaigning, representation, access, capture—but they do not address root causes: Electoral College structure, Senate malapportionment, campaign finance constitutional constraints.
The phase 1 question: Can building momentum through statutory reforms create the coalition and political will needed for constitutional change? Or does incremental success reduce pressure for structural reform by improving conditions just enough?
Phase 2: The Constitutional Question
These reforms would transform the system but require constitutional amendment or structural redesign:
Electoral College Abolition (or NPVIC bypass): Would ensure the president is elected by popular vote, making every vote equal regardless of state. The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact offers a workaround that takes effect when states representing 270 electoral votes join—currently at 205 electoral votes.[^14]
Senate Reform (or Filibuster Reform within structure): Would address the most undemocratic institution—41 senators representing approximately 11% of the population can block any legislation through the filibuster.[^15] Article V protects equal state suffrage, making structural reform essentially impossible.
Campaign Finance Amendment: Would allow comprehensive campaign finance reform by establishing that money is not speech or that Congress may regulate spending in elections. Would require overturning Citizens United and related precedents through constitutional amendment.[^16]
Vote of No Confidence: Would create a mechanism for removing incompetent executives without impeachment, following parliamentary models. Would require constitutional amendment restructuring Articles I and II.
Federal Recall / Federal Direct Democracy: Would provide direct democratic pathways for accountability and agenda-setting. The Constitution vests legislative power in Congress and specifies term lengths, requiring amendment for federal recall or initiative.[^17]
These reforms would have high democratic impact—the highest—but face constitutional barriers that may be insurmountable under normal political conditions.
The phase 2 question: Does the current constitutional dysfunction constitute a crisis that will eventually force structural change—or will the American public tolerate dysfunction indefinitely?
The Strategic Question
The fundamental question posed throughout this series is:
Can the system reform itself, or does reform require crisis?
This question is not definitively answerable. The evidence supports both propositions.
The Itself-Reform Thesis
The “itself-reform” thesis holds that the system has internal mechanisms for self-correction:
1. Judicial review allows the Constitution to be reinterpreted according to changed conditions without formal amendment. Brown v. Board of Education (1954) transformed the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause; West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937) ended the Lochner era’s protection of economic liberty.[^18]
2. Federalism provides laboratories for policy innovation—states and cities can adopt reforms that prove viability and generate evidence. Ranked-choice voting, democracy vouchers, and citizen assemblies all emerged at state and local levels before being considered nationally.
3. Democratic institutions allow elected officials to respond to public pressure—elections work, citizens can organize, movements can build. The Civil Rights Movement, women’s suffrage, and labor rights all advanced through democratic mobilization.
4. Amendment is possible when sufficient consensus exists. The Nineteenth, Twenty-Second, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments passed through ordinary political processes without crisis.[^19]
The evidence for this thesis:
– Ranked-choice voting adoption in Maine, Alaska, and cities nationwide demonstrates reforms can spread without federal mandate.
– NPVIC progress—states representing 205 electoral votes have enacted the compact, pushing Electoral College reform forward without federal action.[^20]
– State-level reforms—campaign disclosure laws, independent redistricting commissions, automatic voter registration—demonstrate innovation and scaling evidence.
If the system can reform itself, phase 1 statutory reforms will succeed, generate evidence, build coalition, and create political will for more transformative change.
The Crisis-Reform Thesis
The “crisis-reform” thesis holds that the system cannot reform itself because the system protects itself:
1. Constitutional barriers are structural, not accidental—the equal state suffrage protection in Article V, the Electoral College in Article II, the separation of powers in Articles I and II were designed for an 18th-century republic.[^21]
2. Supermajority requirements may be insurmountable for structural amendments—no coalition currently exists with the breadth to achieve two-thirds of Congress and three-fourths of the states for controversial structural change.
3. Interest consolidation—the beneficiaries of the status quo have resources, organization, and institutional footholds that make protecting the status quo easier than restructuring the system.[^22]
4. Incremental success defuses crisis pressure—if statutory reforms make the system less dysfunctional, they reduce the urgency for structural change, allowing the status quo to persist.
The evidence for this thesis:
– The Equal Rights Amendment’s failure—fell three states short of ratification despite decades of organizing and majority public support, demonstrating that breadth of coalition, not depth of support, determines amendment success.[^23]
– The 2000 and 2016 elections— Electoral College elected the popular vote loser, but no reform resulted. Crisis events do not guarantee reform.
– The filibuster’s persistence—despite widespread criticism and several reform proposals, the 60-vote threshold remains, protected by senators from both parties who benefit from it.
If crisis is required for structural reform, the current dysfunction may be insufficient. The United States could persist in its current form indefinitely, or dysfunction could intensify until crisis forces change—but crisis might produce outcomes reformers do not want.
The problem with crisis: Crisis produces change, but what change does crisis produce? The Civil War produced the Reconstruction Amendments—and 90 years of Jim Crow. The question is not whether crisis produces change, but what change crisis produces.
The Evidence Is Mixed
Neither thesis is definitively supported by the evidence. Some constitutional amendments passed through ordinary politics (Seventeenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Second, Twenty-Sixth). Some followed crisis (Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth). Some crises produced no constitutional change (2000, 2008, January 6).
The pattern suggests: – Crisis creates possibility for change, but does not guarantee it. – Ordinary politics can produce constitutional change, but requires broad coalition. – Structural reforms face higher barriers than rights extensions, and have not succeeded since Reconstruction.
The question reformers face is strategic: how to prepare for both possibilities—incremental reform that builds momentum, and crisis-driven change that may arrive unpredictably.
What Do We Do Now?
If constitutional barriers are insurmountable for the foreseeable future, what is the strategic path for reform?
Prioritize Reforms by Feasibility
Some reforms can be enacted now with existing political coalitions:
1. Ranked-Choice Voting at state and local level: Momentum exists. Maine, Alaska, cities nationwide. The reform has evidence and cross-ideological support in some contexts.
2. Open Primaries in competitive states: California, Washington, Alaska demonstrate the model. The reform increases turnout and moderates candidate selection without requiring constitutional change.
3. Lobbying Reform with Enforcement: Extending cooling-off periods to two years (OECD recommendation is 12-24 months) and strengthening disclosure requirements is popular and feasible.[^24]
4. Democracy Vouchers expanding: Seattle’s program works and could be replicated. Legal barriers are minimal.
These reforms can be enacted now with existing coalitions. They produce immediate improvement and build evidence for broader reform.
Build Strategic Coalitions for Medium-Term Reforms
Some reforms require coalition-building but are achievable through sustained organizing:
1. House Expansion: No legal barrier exists. The barrier is political opposition—neither party has made this a priority. A coalition could form around representation, constituent service, and reducing the influence of money in larger districts.
2. NPVIC Implementation: States representing 65 more electoral votes need to enact the compact. The campaign continues building momentum; the arithmetic is achievable if swing-state politics allow it.
3. Citizen Assemblies: State legislatures could create advisory assemblies on specific issues. The model works when legislators genuinely cede agenda-setting authority.
These reforms require sustained coalitions but are achievable through democratic mobilization.
Prepare for Multiple Scenarios
The most transformative reforms—constitutional changes—are not achievable under current conditions. They require crisis, constitutional opportunity, or transformational coalition:
Crisis scenarios are unpredictable:
– Constitutional crisis following disputed presidential election – Judicial crisis following controversial Supreme Court rulings – Governance crisis following executive dysfunction
Opportunity scenarios are possibilities, not predictions:
– Article V convention called by states (balanced budget movement continues) – Realignment producing supermajority coalition for a reconstituted party – Long-term demographic shift transforming the electoral map
The question is whether to prepare for these scenarios—or whether preparation is impossible given unpredictability.
The Constitutional Interpretation Path
One path not yet discussed: constitutional interpretation. The Supreme Court can reconstitute constitutional meaning without amendment:
– West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937) ended the Lochner era and enabled the New Deal regulatory state—not through amendment, but through reinterpretation.[^25]
– Brown v. Board of Education (1954) transformed equal protection—and with it, American society—through judicial interpretation, not amendment.
– Citizens United v. FEC (2010) reconstituted campaign finance jurisprudence—and could be overturned by a different Court, not a different Constitution.
The Constitution’s meaning is not fixed. Judicial interpretation provides a path for constitutional change that bypasses the Article V barriers. A different Supreme Court could overturn Citizens United, narrow executive immunity, or reinterpret the Second Amendment—all without amendment.
This path has its own barriers: judicial appointments are political, and the current Court’s composition reflects decades of conservative legal movement strategy. But the interpretive path is a real possibility, and reformers should not ignore it.
A Pragmatic Framework
This series does not answer the question definitively—no one can. But it proposes a pragmatic framework for navigating the reform dilemma:
Now (Statutory Reforms, Feasible):
– Implement RCV wherever possible – Adopt open primaries in competitive states – Extend lobbying reform and strengthen disclosure – Expand democracy vouchers to more cities – Create citizen assemblies on specific contentious issues
Goal: Build evidence, improve outcomes, create momentum, demonstrate viability.
Soon (Coalition Building for Medium-Term Reforms):
– Push House Expansion with coalition advocacy – Advocate for NPVIC adoption in remaining states – Campaign for independent anti-corruption commissions at state level – Support judicial appointment processes that could enable interpretive change
Goal: Build coalitions, generate pressure, demonstrate demand for structural improvement.
If Possible (Constitutional Change):
– Wait for crisis or constitutional opportunity – Be prepared to act when the moment arrives – Advocate for Article V convention safeguards if convention called – Support interpretive change through judicial appointment
Goal: Be positioned to influence outcomes when the barrier to structural change drops.
Meanwhile (Accountability and Alternatives):
– Document and publicize systemic dysfunction – Build alternative democratic structures at state and local level – Learn from comparative systems worldwide – Make defending the status quo politically expensive
Goal: Increase the political cost of inaction, create alternatives that compensate for federal dysfunction.
The Final Insight
The reforms with highest democratic impact have highest barriers. The system protects itself.
But the question is not whether reform is necessary. The question is whether reform is possible—and how, not whether, the United States will eventually adapt its 18th-century constitution to govern a 21st-century democracy.
The evidence suggests that constitutional transformation can follow crisis—but can also occur through ordinary politics when sufficient coalition exists. Crisis creates the possibility for change; it does not guarantee the change reformers want.
The constitutional dysfunction of 21st-century America—the Electoral College that can elect the popular vote loser, the Senate that gives Wyoming and California equal representation, campaign finance that enables influence, impeachment that has become partisan—may or may not constitute a crisis. The dysfunction has been present for decades. Whether it intensifies or persists is unknown.
The question for reformers:
If the system can reform itself, the path is incremental—build evidence, build coalition, build momentum until the barriers become surmountable.
If the system cannot reform itself without crisis, the path is preparation—document dysfunction, build narratives, create alternatives, and be ready when crisis arrives.
Both paths require the same work. The difference is expectation and timeline. Reformers who expect incremental success will be surprised by crisis. Reformers who expect crisis will be surprised by incremental progress. Reformers who prepare for both will be ready for either.
What This All Means
The structural vulnerabilities of the American constitutional system are not partisan problems or recent developments. They were designed in 1787 for a different era, and they have been exploited and adapted over 237 years.
The reforms that would fix these problems require constitutional amendments that may not pass. The reforms that can pass now have moderate impact.
The strategic choice is not between reform and inaction. The choice is between paths:
1. Incremental reform that improves the system but may not transform it—and may reduce pressure for transformation.
2. Crisis-driven reform that transforms the system but is unpredictable and may produce unwanted change.
3. Strategic preparation for both—building the coalition, the evidence, and the narratives that allow reformers to influence outcomes when structural change becomes possible, whether through incremental progress or crisis-driven opportunity.
There is no guarantee of success. The system protects itself, the barriers are high, and history does not promise reform. But the history also shows that change is possible—through crisis when necessary, through coalition when sufficient, through interpretation when the judiciary permits.
Reformers must be as systematic as the system’s defenders—building evidence, coalition, and narratives for the moment when structural change becomes possible, however that moment arrives.
Constitutional Reform: The Tree of Liberty’s Roots: Repairing What Is Rotten
Part 1: The Diagnosis: What’s Broken — Why the system can’t fix itself—and what the founders actually built
Part 2: What Works: Electoral Reform — RCV, open primaries, House expansion—what could pass tomorrow
Part 3: What Works: Removing Unfit Leaders — Votes of no confidence, recall, and why we have nothing comparable
Part 4: What Works: Anti-Capture Mechanisms — Campaign finance, lobbying reform, democracy vouchers—what the evidence shows
Part 5: Novel Mechanisms: What Has Been Tried — Citizen assemblies, sortition, direct democracy—where evidence exists
Part 6: The Constitutional Question — What requires amendment, what can be done statutorily, and whether change is possible
Part 7: A Proposed Framework — You are here
← Part 6: The Constitutional Question
Notes
[^1]: John C. Fortier and Norman J. Ornstein, “The Electoral College and the 2000 Election,” in The Votes That Counted: How the Court Decided the 2000 Presidential Election, ed. Howard Gillman (University of Chicago Press, 2001), 165-181; Kyle Kondik, “The 2020 Presidential Election: Results and Analysis,” Sabato’s Crystal Ball, University of Virginia Center for Politics, December 2020.
[^2]: U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 3; Drew Desilver, “U.S. population keeps growing, but House of Representatives is same size as in Taft era,” Pew Research Center, May 31, 2018, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/31/u-s-population-keeps-growing-but-house-of-representatives-is-same-size-as-in-taft-era/
[^3]: Permanent Apportionment Act of 1929, 2 U.S.C. § 2a; Brian F. Schaffner, “The House of Representatives: The People’s House?” in The Oxford Handbook of the American Congress, ed. Eric Schickler and Frances E. Lee (Oxford University Press, 2020).
[^4]: Joshua Matz, “Impeachment, Politics, and the Constitution,” in Impeachment: A Handbook, ed. Charles L. Black Jr. and Philip Bobbitt (Yale University Press, 2018), 47-89.
[^5]: Richard L. Hasen, The Voting Wars: From Florida 2000 to the Next Election Meltdown (Yale University Press, 2012) 45-78; Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (The New Press, 2010), 219-238.
[^6]: Pew Research Center, “Public Trust in Government: 1958-2024,” https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/09/09/public-trust-in-government-1958-2024/
[^7]: FairVote, “Where Ranked Choice Voting Is Used,” https://fairvote.org/where-ranked-choice-voting-is-used/; Maine Secretary of State, “Ranked-Choice Voting,” https://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/ranking.html
[^8]: California Secretary of State, “Top-Two Primary Information,” https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/upcoming-elections/top-two-primary-information; Washington Secretary of State, “Top 2 Primary,” https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/top-two-primary.aspx
[^9]: Permanent Apportionment Act of 1929, 2 U.S.C. § 2a; Kristen D. Burnett, “The House of Representatives: The People’s House?” in The American Congress: The Building of Democracy, ed. Julian E. Zelizer (Houghton Mifflin, 2004), 484-501.
[^10]: Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission, “Democracy Voucher Program—2019 Annual Report,” https://www.seattle.gov/elections/about-our-elections/voting-methods-democracy-vouchers; Jennifer Heerwig and Brian J. McCabe, “The Democratizing Potential of Democracy Vouchers,” in Campaign Finance Reform: The Good, the Bad, and the Unlikely, ed. Michael S. Kang and Michael J. Malbin (Brookings Institution Press, 2021).
[^11]: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3” (OECD Publishing, 2014), 45-67; U.S. Code, Title 18, Section 207 (Post-employment restrictions).
[^12]: Irish Citizens’ Assembly, “Final Reports and Recommendations,” https://citizensassembly.ie/en/How-Ireland-Voted/; Jane Mansbridge, “A Systemic Approach to Deliberative Democracy,” in Deliberative Systems: Deliberative Democracy at the Large Scale, ed. John Parkinson and Jane Mansbridge (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1-26.
[^13]: Tony Kwok, “ICAC: Hong Kong’s Experience,” in Anti-Corruption: The Hong Kong Experience, ed. Tony Kwok (Hong Kong University Press, 2019); Michael Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 112-145.
[^14]: National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/; Edward B. Foley, “The Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote,” Election Law Journal 7, no. 4 (2008): 272-288.
[^15]: U.S. Constitution, Article V (“no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate”); Sarah Binder, “The History of the Filibuster,” Brookings Institution, May 17, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/filibuster-reform-the-history-of-the-filibuster/
[^16]: Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Robert Post, Citizens Divided: Campaign Finance Reform and the Constitution (Harvard University Press, 2014).
[^17]: U.S. Constitution, Article I (legislative power vested in Congress); Article II (executive term of four years).
[^18]: Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
[^19]: U.S. Constitution, Amendments XVII, XIX, XXII, XXVI; Ellen Carol DuBois, Suffrage: Women’s Long Battle for the Ballot (Oxford University Press, 2020).
[^20]: National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, current status: 205 electoral votes pledged (as of 2024), https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/
[^21]: U.S. Constitution, Article V; Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (University of North Carolina Press, 1969), 513-553.
[^22]: Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens,” Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 3 (2014): 564-581 (study conclusions contested but methodology demonstrates influence concentration); Jeffrey A. Winters, Oligarchy (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 204-231.
[^23]: Jane J. Mansbridge, Why We Lost the ERA (University of Chicago Press, 1986), 3-45.
[^24]: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust,” 45-67.
[^25]: West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Cass R. Sunstein, The Second Bill of Rights: FDR’s Unfinished Revolution and Why We Need It More Than Ever (Basic Books, 2004), 57-89.
This is the final part of “The Tree of Liberty’s Roots: Repairing What Is Rotten.” The complete series examines the structural vulnerabilities of American democracy, the reforms that work and don’t work, the constitutional barriers to transformational change, and the strategic framework for navigating the reform dilemma.