The Diagnosis: What’s Broken
Part 1 of “The Tree of Liberty’s Roots: Repairing What Is Rotten”
The United States Constitution was designed by men who had just fought a revolution against tyranny. They built a system to prevent the concentration of power, to ensure that no single branch could dominate, to create checks and balances that would preserve liberty.
What they built has worked. What they built has also failed.
For 237 years, a constitution designed before industrial capitalism, before mass media, before a standing army, has governed a 21st-century democracy. The system they designed to prevent tyranny has become a system that enables undue influence. The mechanisms they created to ensure deliberation have become mechanisms that often prevent action. The compromise they crafted to unite competing states created a system where a minority can block the majority or win the presidency despite losing the popular vote.
This is not a partisan argument. The vulnerabilities in the American constitutional system have been exploited by both parties, at different times, to different ends. Democrats have used the filibuster to block judicial nominations, gerrymandered state legislative districts in states they control, and relied on executive orders to bypass congressional gridlock. Republicans have used the same filibuster to block legislation, structured the Supreme Court confirmation process to their advantage, and won the presidency twice while losing the popular vote. The problem is structural, not partisan. And understanding the problem is the first step toward fixing it.
The Counterargument: Why These Structures Exist
Before examining what’s broken, it’s worth understanding what the founders intended—and what defenders of the current system argue.
The Federalist Papers make the case for the constitutional structure: separation of powers prevents tyranny by ensuring that ambition counteracts ambition.[^1] The Senate, with equal representation for each state, was designed to be a deliberative body insulated from popular passions—a check on the more democratic House.[^20] The Electoral College was intended to prevent demagogues from winning the presidency by ensuring that electors, not voters, made the final choice.[^21] The difficulty of constitutional amendment was deliberate: the founders believed that fundamental change should require broad consensus, nottemporary majorities.[^22]
Defenders argue that these structures have preserved liberty for over two centuries. The separation of powers has prevented dictatorship. The Senate’s deliberative nature has slowed hasty legislation. The Electoral College has forced presidential candidates to build coalitions across states rather than running up margins in population centers. Judicial review has protected minority rights against majority tyranny.[^23]
These arguments deserve engagement, not dismissal. The question is not whether the founders were wrong, but whether structures designed for an 18th-century republic remain appropriate for a 21st-century democracy—and whether the vulnerabilities in those structures have been exploited in ways the founders did not anticipate.
The Five Vulnerabilities
The American constitutional system has five structural vulnerabilities that enable dysfunction. These are not bugs in an otherwise well-designed system. They are features of a system designed for a different era—features that have become vulnerabilities as political parties, campaign finance, and polarization have evolved in ways the founders did not foresee.
1. The Separation of Powers Paradox
The Constitution divides power among three branches—legislative, executive, and judicial—with the expectation that ambition would counteract ambition.[^1] Each branch would defend its prerogatives against encroachment by the others, creating a system where no single branch could dominate.
But the founders did not design the system with organized political parties in mind. Yes, they anticipated factions—Federalist No. 10 is famously about the danger of factions[^24]—but they did not anticipate stable, national party organizations that would bind legislators to presidents across branches. The party system that emerged in the 1790s was something new: a mechanism for coordinating ambition across institutions.
When the same party controls the presidency and Congress, the system of checks and balances can break down. Party loyalty may supersede institutional loyalty. Members of Congress, tasked with overseeing the executive branch, may defend a president of their own party—investigating less, confirming more, ignoring misconduct when it serves partisan interests.
The remedy for presidential misconduct—the impeachment process designed by the founders—has been tested three times in the modern era. In 1974, Richard Nixon resigned before impeachment proceedings concluded, when Republican senators made clear they would vote to convict. In 1998, Bill Clinton was impeached by the House but acquitted by the Senate in a vote that fell largely along party lines. In 2019 and 2021, Donald Trump was impeached twice and acquitted twice, with senators voting almost entirely along party lines.[^2]
This is not because no president has deserved conviction. It is because conviction requires a two-thirds supermajority, and when impeachment becomes a partisan exercise, senators tend to vote with their party, not their judgment. The mechanism designed to remove incompetent or corrupt executives has become another tool of partisan warfare—something to be threatened, not reliably used.
The vulnerability: Accountability depends on branches wanting to check each other. When party loyalty outweighs institutional loyalty, the system fails.
Counterargument: The separation of powers has prevented dictatorship for over two centuries. When different parties control different branches, the system works as intended. The question is whether unified government—which has produced significant achievements like the New Deal and Great Society[^25]—has also produced the conditions for accountability failure.
2. The Electoral College’s Democracy Deficit
The Electoral College was a compromise between competing visions of how to elect a president. Small states feared being dominated by large states. Southern states feared being dominated by Northern states. The compromise—a body of electors chosen by each state, with each state’s electors equal to its congressional delegation—ensured that voters in small states and Southern states would have disproportionate influence.[^3]
That disproportionate influence continues today, and it has produced a system where the candidate who receives fewer votes can win the presidency. This has happened five times in American history, twice in the last 25 years: George W. Bush in 2000 and Donald Trump in 2016.[^4]
The mathematics are straightforward. Because every state gets at least three electors (two senators plus one representative) regardless of population, voters in Wyoming have approximately 3.6 times the electoral power of voters in California.[^5] A vote in Vermont carries more weight than a vote in Texas.
In practice, this means presidential candidates campaign in a handful of battleground states while ignoring most of the country. In 2020, 94% of campaign events occurred in just 12 states, with two-thirds concentrated in six: Pennsylvania, Florida, Michigan, Wisconsin, Arizona, and North Carolina.[^6] The interests of voters in California, Texas, New York, and Illinois—the four most populous states—are essentially irrelevant to the presidential election.
The vulnerability: The person who wins the most votes can lose the election. This has happened twice in the 21st century and five times in American history.
Counterargument: The Electoral College forces candidates to build geographically broad coalitions rather than running up margins in population centers. A pure popular vote would incentivize candidates to focus on urban areas and ignore rural states entirely. The founders designed the system to prevent regional candidates from winning the presidency.[^21]
Response: The geographic breadth argument made sense when regional interests were clearly defined. Today, the Electoral College does not produce geographically broad coalitions—it produces swing-state focus. Candidates do not campaign in rural states; they campaign in competitive states. Wyoming is safe Republican; Vermont is safe Democrat. Neither receives serious attention.
3. Senate Malapportionment
The Great Compromise of 1787 gave every state two senators, regardless of population. At the time, the largest state (Virginia) had about 10 times the population of the smallest (Delaware).[^7]
Today, the ratio is 68 to 1. California has 39 million residents; Wyoming has 576,000. Both have two senators.
The Senate’s structure is not merely undemocratic in principle. It is undemocratic in practice, and the effects are profound. Because the Senate requires 60 votes to overcome a filibuster for most legislation, 41 senators representing as little as 11% of the population can block any law.[^8] The calculation: the 20 smallest states contain approximately 11% of the U.S. population, and their 40 senators plus one additional senator can sustain a filibuster.
This creates what political scientist Frances Lee has called “minority veto power as design feature.”[^9] The Senate was explicitly designed to protect small states from large states, agricultural interests from commercial interests, slave states from free states. Those protections remain embedded in the system.
The vulnerability: 41 senators representing approximately 11% of the population can block any legislation. A majority of Americans can support a policy and face institutional oppositionfrom states containing a small fraction of the population.
Counterargument: The Senate was designed to protect minority interests from majority tyranny. Small states would not have ratified the Constitution without equal representation in at least one chamber. The Senate serves as a deliberative body that slows hasty legislation—another check on popular passions.[^20]
Response: The question is whether the minority protected by the Senate today is the same minority the founders intended to protect. The small-state coalition in 1787 was geographic. Today, the small-state coalition is predominantly rural and predominantly conservative. The Senate’s malapportionment now protects a partisan minority, not a geographic one.[^26]
4. Campaign Finance and the Influence Problem
The First Amendment protects free speech. In the 21st century, the Supreme Court has interpreted that protection to mean that campaign contributions are a form of speech, and that limits on campaign contributions are unconstitutional.[^10]
The result is a political system where money buys access and influence. In 2020, federal candidates and political parties spent a combined $14.4 billion on campaigns—the most expensive election in American history.[^11] The largest donors wield outsized influence over policy. Industries with deep pockets— pharmaceuticals, finance, fossil fuels—spend millions on lobbying and campaign contributions, and receive billions in favorable policy outcomes.[^12]
This is not bribery in the traditional sense. It is something more insidious: a system where access to policymakers requires money, where the wealthy can purchase the ability to shape policy, and where those without resources find themselves excluded from the political process.
The 2014 Princeton study by Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page remains the definitive investigation of this phenomenon. They examined 1,779 policy outcomes and found that “economic elites and business interest groups have substantial independent impact on U.S. government policy while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence.”[^13]
Their finding is significant: policy outcomes correlate strongly with the preferences of economic elites and business interest groups, and weakly with the preferences of average citizens. This is not the same as “capture”—the study measures correlation, not causation, and does not establish that elites control outcomes. But it does establish that the policy preferences of wealthy interests predict outcomes better than the preferences of average citizens.
The vulnerability: Wealth buys influence. Campaign contributions have become the price of access to policymakers, creating a political system where economic interests have disproportionate influence relative to their numbers.
Counterargument: Money is speech, and speech is protected by the First Amendment. Limiting political spending limits political speech, which the government cannot do under the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court.[^10] The wealthy have the same right to participate in politics as anyone else; their resources give them more influence, but also make them larger targets for opposition.
Response: The First Amendment argument has force, which is why comprehensive campaign finance reform requires either new interpretations of existing precedent or constitutional amendment. The question is whether the current system—where money correlates with influence—is compatible with democratic equality, and if not, what reforms are possible within constitutional constraints.
5. Federalism’s Race to the Bottom
The Constitution divides power between the federal government and the states, creating a federal structure intended to preserve local control while ensuring national coordination. But when states can serve as laboratories of policy innovation, they can also serve as laboratories of regulatory evasion.
In the absence of federal action, states compete for economic investment by lowering standards. Race-to-the-bottom dynamics have shaped environmental policy, labor law, corporate regulation, and consumer protection. States attract businesses by offering tax incentives and regulatory exemptions, forcing other states to compete by lowering their own standards.[^15]
The problem is compounded when the federal government is gridlocked. When Congress cannot pass environmental legislation, states are left to create their own standards—some strong, some weak. When Congress cannot pass labor legislation, states set their own minimum wages and workplace safety rules. The result is not a patchwork of innovative policies but a patchwork of weakened protections, with corporations shopping for the most permissive regulatory environments.[^16]
The vulnerability: Federal gridlock creates regulatory voids. States compete to fill those voids—often by competing to lower standards rather than raise them. The result is not innovation but erosion.
Counterargument: Federalism allows states to experiment with different policies and learn from each other. States have led on issues like same-sex marriage, marijuana legalization, and environmental protection. The “race to the bottom” is not inevitable; states can also race to the top.[^27]
Response: Federalism has produced innovation. But when states compete for mobile capital, the dynamics favor lowering standards. The question is whether the current balance between state and federal power optimizes for innovation—or for regulatory evasion.
The Pattern: Influence, Norm Erosion, Constitutional Hardball
These vulnerabilities reinforce each other. Campaign finance enables wealthy interests to gain influence. When a minority party blocks reform, Senate malapportionment ensures that voters cannot easily remove them—the Electoral College may give the presidency to the loser of the popular vote, and the separation of powers prevents accountability when branches refuse to check each other.
Political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt have documented how these dynamics can erode democratic norms[^17]:
1. Influence concentration: Wealthy interests gain influence through campaign finance, lobbying, and access. They shape policy outcomes by shaping who wins elections and what policies legislators consider.
2. Information weaponization: Influential interests shape public discourse through media ownership, campaign messaging, and think-tank funding. They frame issues to their advantage, obscure inconvenient facts, and create alternative narratives.
3. Norm erosion: Politicians undermine the unwritten rules that constrain behavior—refusing to confirm judges, shutting down the government, denying election results, treating political opponents as enemies rather than adversaries.
4. Constitutional hardball: When norms fail, political actors use legal but norm-violating tactics—filling Supreme Court seats in ways that depart from precedent, changing voting rules to advantage incumbents, using emergency powers for political purposes.
5. Competitive authoritarian trajectory: The system remains formally democratic—elections occur, courts operate, legislatures meet—but the playing field tilts. The opposition can compete, but the rules favor incumbents. Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that this is a trajectory, not a current state: the United States has been moving in this direction for decades, though the destination is not predetermined.[^18]
This pattern is not inevitable. Democratic norms have broken and repaired before. The question is whether the vulnerabilities in the constitutional structure make repair more difficult—and whether those vulnerabilities are being exploited in ways the founders did not anticipate.
The Question of Reform
Understanding what’s broken is the first step toward fixing it. But the founders understood something that modern reformers often forget: the system protects itself.
The United States Constitution is among the hardest constitutions in the world to amend. Article V requires a two-thirds vote in both houses of Congress or a convention called by two-thirds of the states, followed by ratification by three-fourths of the states. In 237 years, only 27 amendments have succeeded—and one of those was the repeal of another.[^19]
The reforms that would address these vulnerabilities—abolishing the Electoral College, reforming the Senate, overturning Citizens United—require constitutional amendment. The reforms that don’t require amendment—campaign finance reform, voting rights legislation, state-level electoral reforms—face legislative filibusters in the Senate and judicial review in a Supreme Court shaped by the interests that benefit from the status quo.
This creates what might be called the reformer’s paradox: the reforms with the highest democratic impact have the highest barriers, and the reforms with the lowest barriers have the lowest impact.
This is not coincidental. The system was designed to resist rapid change. The question is whether change can come at all—and whether it can come in time.
Constitutional Reform: The Tree of Liberty’s Roots: Repairing What Is Rotten
Part 1: The Diagnosis: What’s Broken — You are here
Part 2: What Works: Electoral Reform — RCV, open primaries, House expansion—what could pass tomorrow
Part 3: What Works: Removing Unfit Leaders — Votes of no confidence, recall, and why we have nothing comparable
Part 4: What Works: Anti-Capture Mechanisms — Campaign finance, lobbying reform, democracy vouchers—what the evidence shows
Part 5: Novel Mechanisms: What Has Been Tried — Citizen assemblies, sortition, direct democracy—where evidence exists
Part 6: The Constitutional Question — What requires amendment, what can be done statutorily, and whether change is possible
Part 7: A Proposed Framework — How to prioritize reforms—and whether the system can fix itself
Part 2: What Works: Electoral Reform →
Notes
[^1]: Madison, James. “Federalist No. 51.” The Federalist Papers, 1788. “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”
[^2]: U.S. Senate. “Impeachment.” https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Impeachment.htm
[^3]: Akhil Reed Amar, “The Electoral College and the Wrong Constitution,” in America’s Unwritten Constitution (Basic Books, 2012), 455-478.
[^4]: National Archives. “Presidential Election Results.” https://www.archives.gov/electoral-college/results
[^5]: Drew Desilver, “How Does the Electoral College Work?” Pew Research Center, November 4, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/11/04/how-does-the-electoral-college-work/
[^6]: National Popular Vote Inc., “Battleground States,” https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/battleground-states
[^7]: U.S. Census Bureau, “First Census of the United States, 1790.” https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_decades/overview/1790.html
[^8]: Calculation: The 20 smallest states contain approximately 11% of the U.S. population. Their 40 senators plus one additional senator can sustain a filibuster, blocking legislation supported by senators representing 89% of the population. See Frances E. Lee and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, “Sizing Up the Senate: The Unequal Consequences of Equal Representation” (University of Chicago Press, 1999), 42-43.
[^9]: Lee, Frances E. “Minority Rule as Design Feature.” Annual Review of Political Science 24 (2021): 197-218.
[^10]: Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 572 U.S. 185 (2014).
[^11]: Federal Election Commission, “Federal Elections 2020: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives,” 2021.
[^12]: Lee Drutman, “The Business of Lobbying,” in The Influence Industry, eds. Theda Skocpol and Alexander Hertel-Fernandez (Russell Sage Foundation, 2018), 25-57.
[^13]: Gilens, Martin, and Benjamin I. Page. “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens.” Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 3 (2014): 564-581, 572.
[^14]: Ibid., 573.
[^15]: Richard B. Stewart, “Regulation in a Fragmented World: The Challenge of Global Environmental Protection,” in The Environment and Emerging Development Issues, ed. Mohan Munasinghe (Oxford University Press, 1999), 376-397.
[^16]: Paul E. Peterson, “The Rise of the American Regulatory State,” Journal of Politics 79, no. 4 (2017): 1245-1256.
[^17]: Levitsky, Steven, and Daniel Ziblatt. How Democracies Die (Crown, 2018).
[^18]: Levitsky, Steven, and Daniel Ziblatt. “The Rhetoric of Authoritarianism,” in The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology, ed. Edwin Amenta, Kate Nash, and Alan Scott (Wiley, 2017), 217-232.
[^19]: U.S. National Archives, “Constitutional Amendments,” https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/amendments-11-27
[^20]: Hamilton, Alexander. “Federalist No. 62.” The Federalist Papers, 1788. The Senate as “a temperate and dignified body” insulated from popular passions.
[^21]: Hamilton, Alexander. “Federalist No. 68.” The Federalist Papers, 1788. The Electoral College as a mechanism to prevent demagogues.
[^22]: Hamilton, Alexander. “Federalist No. 85.” The Federalist Papers, 1788. The difficulty of amendment ensures that “alterations…will not be too frequently made.”
[^23]: Bickel, Alexander. The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (Yale University Press, 1962). Judicial review as protection of minority rights.
[^24]: Madison, James. “Federalist No. 10.” The Federalist Papers, 1787. The danger of factions and the advantages of a large republic.
[^25]: Milkis, Sidney M., and Michael Nelson. The American Presidency: Origins and Development, 1776-2015 (CQ Press, 2016), 285-312. Unified government and the New Deal coalition.
[^26]: Griffin, Stephen M. “American Constitutionalism After Bush v. Gore,” Constitutional Commentary 18 (2001): 247-275. The Senate’s malapportionment now protects a partisan minority.
[^27]: Volden, Christopher. “The Politics of Competitive Federalism: A Race to the Bottom?” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 35, no. 2 (2005): 245-263. States can race to the top or the bottom depending on policy area.