The Constitutional Question
Part 6 of “The Tree of Liberty’s Roots: Repairing What Is Rotten”
The central dilemma appears repeatedly throughout this series: the reforms with the highest democratic impact have the highest barriers.
Electoral College abolition would ensure that the president is elected by popular vote, representing every vote equally. Abolition requires a constitutional amendment—and small states that benefit from the Electoral College would have to vote to reduce their own influence.
Senate reform would address the most undemocratic institution in the American political system—41 senators representing 11% of the population can block any legislation. Reform requires constitutional amendment, and Article V explicitly protects equal state suffrage.[^1]
Campaign finance reform would eliminate the fundamental mechanism of elite influence in American politics. Reform requires constitutional amendment, and no coalition exists to achieve the supermajorities in Congress and the states needed to pass it.
Vote of no confidence would fix the removal mechanism that is effectively inert in practice. Reform would require rewriting the American Constitution to make the United States a parliamentary system.
The pattern is not coincidental. The system protects itself. The question is whether constitutional change is possible at all, and if so, under what conditions.
The Article V Mechanism
The Constitution provides two methods for amendment:
1. Congressional proposal: Two-thirds of both houses propose amendments, which must then be ratified by three-fourths of the states.
2. Convention proposal: Two-thirds of states (34 out of 50) call a convention to propose amendments, which must then be ratified by three-fourths of the states.[^2]
The constitutional pathway for amendment is designed to be difficult. The founders saw the Constitution as a social contract that should not be easily altered. They designed the amendment process to require broad consensus—not majority rule, not supermajority rule, but super-supermajorities: two-thirds of Congress, three-fourths of the states, or two-thirds of the states and three-fourths of states.
In 237 years, 27 amendments have been ratified—one repealing another (Prohibition).[^3] The rate of amendment has slowed dramatically: ten amendments were ratified in the first 75 years (1789-1864), five in the next 75 years (1865-1939), six in the next 75 years (1940-2015), and exactly one in the last 25 years (1995-2020).[^4]
The pattern reveals two observations about successful amendments:
1. They are mostly rights extensions, not structural changes. Only four of the 27—the Twelfth, Twentieth, Twenty-Second, and Twenty-Fifth—amended the structure of government, and these were technical adjustments to presidential election and succession. The rest extended constitutional protections to marginalized groups or changed voting qualifications.
2. They required sustained coalition over long periods. The Fourteenth Amendment—equal protection, due process—was proposed in 1866 and ratified in 1868 amid Reconstruction, but its substantive meaning was fought over for a century. The Nineteenth Amendment—women’s suffrage—was first proposed in 1878 and not ratified until 1920, after a four-decade campaign.[^5]
Structural amendments—amendments that would transform the American system—have not succeeded since Reconstruction. The Equal Rights Amendment, which would have guaranteed equal legal rights regardless of sex, was proposed in 1972 and fell three states short of the 38 needed for ratification when its 1982 deadline passed.[^6] A new deadline was not granted, and the amendment remains unratified.
Exceptions: Non-Crisis Amendments
The crisis-reform pattern has exceptions. Not all constitutional amendments required crisis:
The Seventeenth Amendment (1913): Direct election of senators replaced state legislative selection. This structural amendment passed through ordinary political processes—progressive reform momentum, not constitutional crisis. State legislatures were already moving toward direct election through primaries; the amendment formalized what was becoming practice.[^7]
The Nineteenth Amendment (1920): Women’s suffrage followed decades of organizing, but it did not require economic collapse, war, or constitutional breakdown. It passed through sustained coalition building and the political leverage of the suffrage movement.[^8]
The Twenty-Second Amendment (1951): Presidential term limits passed following Franklin Roosevelt’s four terms, but this was responsive, not crisis-driven. The amendment institutionalized a norm that George Washington had established by precedent.[^9]
The Twenty-Sixth Amendment (1971): Lowering the voting age to 18 passed during the Vietnam War, but Congress acted preemptively—the Supreme Court had already ruled that Congress could set the voting age for federal elections, and states faced administrative complexity from different voting ages for state and federal elections. The amendment was consensus, not crisis.[^10]
These exceptions matter. They demonstrate that constitutional amendment without crisis is possible—when the reform addresses a genuine problem, when the coalition is broad rather than deep, and when the change does not threaten entrenched interests.
The question is whether modern structural reforms—Electoral College abolition, Senate reform, campaign finance—can achieve the same broad coalitions that passed the Seventeenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Second, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments.
The Convention Question
Article V also provides for a constitutional convention if two-thirds of the states (34) call for one. The convention has never happened—the 27 amendments were all proposed by Congress.
But the convention mechanism is gathering attention because it provides a way around Congressional inaction. A Congress that cannot or will not propose amendments can be bypassed if states force the issue.
The Balanced Budget Convention Push
As of 2025, 28 states have called for a balanced budget convention under Article V.[^11] Six states—Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Dakota, and Wyoming—have calls within state law that some argue qualify, though legal scholars disagree about whether they count toward the 34 needed. If those six are counted, the convention could be forced.
But the balanced budget push reveals the danger of the convention mechanism: the agenda is uncontrollable. States might call a convention for a balanced budget amendment, but the convention, once called, could propose anything—not just a balanced budget. It could propose term limits for Congress, or Electoral College abolition, or campaign finance reform, or any other change the convention itself chooses to propose.
The text of Article V states: “Congress…shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments…which…shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Conventions of three fourths of the several States.”[^12]
The convention mechanism does not limit the convention to the subject states call for. The convention can propose anything. The states then decide what to ratify—but the agenda is open.
The Agenda Problem
Who decides what the convention proposes? Who are the delegates? How are delegates selected? What is quorum? What voting threshold does the convention use for proposing amendments—majority, supermajority, unanimity?
The Constitution provides no answers. The constitutional convention mechanism has never been used. The rules are undefined.
The danger is not that a convention would pass radical changes. The danger is that a convention’s proposals would send the Constitution into political chaos, with competing claims about what was or was not proposed, what does or does not require ratification, and whether the convention itself is legitimate.[^13]
The last time the United States faced a fundamental constitutional crisis—the secession crisis of 1860-61—the Constitution itself did not resolve the problem. The Union won the Civil War and then passed the Reconstruction Amendments through Congress. A convention was not necessary.
But the convention question has not gone away. The push for a balanced budget amendment reflects the reality that Congress will not propose amendments on its own. If states want amendment, they must bypass Congress.
The question: If a convention is called, who controls the agenda? How can the process be constrained to prevent outcomes that enshrine minority rule or strip constitutional protections?
The Constitutional Barriers
Beyond the convention question, specific barriers exist for the most transformative reforms:
The Electoral College Barrier
Abolishing the Electoral College requires a constitutional amendment. Small states—Wyoming, Vermont, Alaska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Delaware, Rhode Island, Montana, Maine, New Hampshire, and others—benefit from the Electoral College’s disproportionate weighting. Voters in Wyoming have approximately 3.6 times the electoral power of voters in California per vote cast.[^14]
The coalition that benefits from the Electoral College—small states where the president is not selected by popular vote—has sufficient power to block any amendment that would reduce that power. Sixteen states have fewer than four electoral votes each; they would all have to vote against their own institutional interests for amendment to pass.
This has not happened in 237 years. The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact offers a workaround—states pledge electors to the national popular vote winner—but this approach faces its own legal challenges.[^15]
The Senate Equal Suffrage Protection
Article V explicitly protects the equal suffrage of states in the Senate: “no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.”[^16]
This protection was not accidental. It was a compromise required to get small states to ratify the Constitution. The Great Compromise of 1787—equal state representation in the Senate, proportional representation in the House—was the price of union.
Any amendment that would reduce or eliminate equal state representation is prohibited by Article V without the consent of the affected state. The Senate’s structure—and the malapportionment that gives Wyoming and California two senators each—cannot be changed through amendment.
The Senate can be reformed within that structure—filibuster reform is a rules change requiring only simple majority in the Senate. But the fundamental structure cannot be changed.
The Money as Speech Precedent
Campaign finance reform faces the barrier not of constitutional text but of constitutional interpretation. The Supreme Court has held that restrictions on political spending implicate First Amendment speech protections.[^17]
Overruling Citizens United v. FEC (2010) and McCutcheon v. FEC (2014) would not require constitutional amendment. The Constitution does not say “money is speech.” That is a judicial interpretation that could be reversed by a different Court.
But the Court’s composition—appointed by presidents who benefited from the post-Citizens United campaign finance regime—makes reversal uncertain. The Court could overturn precedent, but the Court has shown limited inclination to do so.
Constitutional amendment—explicitly declaring that money is not speech or that Congress may regulate campaign spending—would solve the problem but faces the supermajority requirements that have prevented any contentious amendment for decades.
The Separation of Powers Design
Implementing a vote of no confidence or parliamentary removal mechanism would require rewriting the Constitution’s separation of powers structure. The president is elected by the Electoral College, serves for a fixed four-year term, and cannot be removed except through impeachment for criminal misconduct.
Switching to a parliamentary system would require amendments to Articles I and II that fundamentally restructure the relationship between branches. The United States is designed as a separation of powers system, not a parliamentary system—and the Constitution was written with that intention.
This is not a barrier that can be overcome through interpretation. It is a structural design choice. Changing it requires constitutional transformation, not amendment.
The Standard Path: Amendment by Congress
Article V’s standard method for amendment—Congressional proposal and state ratification—has succeeded 27 times. But it has not succeeded for structural amendments in the modern era.
The standard pathway requires two things:
1. Sustained coalition. A coalition committed to amendment must form, organize, and maintain pressure over years or decades. The Nineteenth Amendment—women’s suffrage—took four decades from first proposal to ratification.
2. Supermajorities. Two-thirds of both houses of Congress and three-fourths of the states must agree. The coalition must be broad, not just deep. The Equal Rights Amendment had depth—strong support among its supporters—but not breadth—the geographic distribution of support fell short of the 38 states needed in 1982.[^18]
For structural amendments—Electoral College abolition, Senate reform, campaign finance reform—no coalition currently exists with the breadth and depth to succeed.
The question: What would create such a coalition? A crisis? A constitutional breakdown that exposes the system’s dysfunction to the point where structural change becomes necessary?
The Crisis Model
Some constitutional amendments passed following crisis. Others passed through ordinary political processes. The pattern is suggestive but not determinative.
The Reconstruction Amendments (13, 14, 15)
The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments abolished slavery, established equal protection and due process, and guaranteed voting rights regardless of race. These were structural amendments—they transformed the Constitution from a document that protected slavery and white male suffrage to one that prohibited slavery and protected rights for all.
But the amendments passed amid crisis: the Civil War itself, the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, the military occupation of the South, the Radical Republicans’ control of Congress, and the constitutional understanding that the rebellion had invalidated the Southern states’ participation in the amendment process.[^19]
These were not ordinary amendments. They were the price of re-admitting the former Confederacy to the Union. They passed with overwhelming force—Congress was dominated by Radical Republicans, and the Southern states were excluded from the process until the amendments were forced upon them as a condition of readmission.
The New Deal Era
The New Deal did not produce constitutional amendments, but the crisis of the Great Depression produced legislation that reorganized government power—the Social Security Act, the Wagner Act, the Glass-Steagall Act—that the Supreme Court upheld in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937), abandoning its pre-New Deal jurisprudence that protected economic liberty as a constitutional right.[^20]
Reorganization came through legislation and judicial reinterpretation, not amendment. But the context—a crisis that produced massive Congressional majorities—enabled change that would not have been possible in normal times.
The Pattern and Its Limits
The United States has reorganized power following crisis. The Civil War produced the Reconstruction Amendments. The Great Depression produced New Deal legislation. World War II produced post-war institutions—the United Nations, Bretton Woods—that reorganized international power.
But the pattern has limits. The crisis of 2000—the presidential election decided by the Supreme Court—did not produce Electoral College reform. The crisis of 2008—the financial collapse—did not produce structural economic reform. The crisis of January 6, 2021—the Capitol insurrection—has not, as of this writing, produced structural constitutional reform.
Crisis creates the possibility for change, but it does not guarantee change, and it does not determine the direction of change. The question is not whether crisis produces change, but whether crisis produces the change reformers want.
The Case for the Status Quo
The Constitution was designed with barriers to change for a reason. The founders feared both tyranny of the majority and instability from frequent constitutional revision. The supermajority requirements in Article V were intentional protections.
Stability benefits:
– Fixed terms provide predictability – Separation of powers prevents concentration of authority – Federalism allows state experimentation – Judicial review provides adaptation without amendment
The argument: The barriers to amendment protect against both ill-considered changes and changes that would strip protections from minorities. A system that could easily amend the Constitution could also easily amend away rights.
The counterargument is that the barriers have become too high—that the Constitution cannot adapt to changed conditions, that minority rule has become entrenched, that the system cannot correct its own deficiencies.
But the status quo is not purely dysfunctional. It is a system with both strengths and weaknesses, designed for a different era but adaptable through interpretation, federalism, and amendment when sufficient consensus exists.
What Can Be Done Statutorily?
If constitutional barriers are insurmountable for the highest-impact reforms, what can be done statutorily without amendment?
Feasible Statutory Reforms
Some reforms in this series do not require constitutional amendment:
1. Ranked-Choice Voting: States and cities can implement RCV without constitutional amendment. Maine and Alaska have already done so.
2. Open Primaries: States can adopt open or nonpartisan primaries without constitutional amendment. California and Washington have already done so.
3. House Expansion: The House’s cap at 435 is statutory, not constitutional. Congress could repeal the Permanent Apportionment Act of 1929 through ordinary legislation.[^21]
4. Lobbying Reform with Enforcement: Congress can extend cooling-off periods and strengthen disclosure without constitutional amendment.
5. Citizen Assemblies (Advisory): States and Congress can create advisory citizen assemblies without constitutional amendment.
6. Democracy Vouchers: Cities and states can implement voucher programs without constitutional amendment.
7. ICAC-Style Independent Commissions: States can create anti-corruption commissions without constitutional amendment.
The Constitutional Barriers to Statutory Reform
The following reforms require constitutional amendment:
1. Electoral College Abolition: The Constitution establishes the Electoral College in Article II and the Twelfth Amendment.
2. Senate Reform: Article V explicitly protects equal state suffrage.
3. Vote of No Confidence: Would require rewriting Articles I and II.
4. Campaign Finance Reform (Comprehensive): Would require overturning Citizens United or amending the Constitution to override it.
5. Federal Recall: The Constitution specifies term lengths.
6. Federal Direct Democracy: The Constitution vests legislative power in Congress.
7. Sortition: The Constitution requires elected representation.
Not all reforms are equal. Some can be passed through ordinary legislation. Some require constitutional amendment. The difference determines what is possible and when.
The Central Insight
The reforms with the highest democratic impact have the highest barriers. This is not coincidental. The Constitution was designed for an 18th-century agrarian republic and protects structural features—equal Senate representation, Electoral College, separation of powers—that were appropriate in 1787 but generate tension in the 21st century.
The question: Is the Constitution the solution or the problem?
Found in the Constitution’s design, the barriers to reform are the same as the protections against hasty change. The Constitution prevents both tyranny of the majority and rapid structural transformation. That protection also makes reform difficult.
Reformers must choose between two paths:
1. Accept the barriers and work within them. Pass statutory reforms—RCV, open primaries, House expansion, lobbying reform—that improve the system within constitutional constraints. Build incremental momentum for more transformative change.
2. Seek crisis-driven structural change. Wait for crisis—or work to create the conditions for crisis—to generate political will for constitutional amendment, while accepting that crisis risks producing outcomes reformers do not want.
There is no guarantee that either path succeeds. The incremental path may reduce pressure for structural change without achieving it. The crisis path may produce change, but not the change reformers seek.
The final part of this series proposes a framework for navigating the choice—and for thinking strategically about which reforms to prioritize now, which to defer, and how to prepare for both possibilities.
Constitutional Reform: The Tree of Liberty’s Roots: Repairing What Is Rotten
Part 1: The Diagnosis: What’s Broken — Why the system can’t fix itself—and what the founders actually built
Part 2: What Works: Electoral Reform — RCV, open primaries, House expansion—what could pass tomorrow
Part 3: What Works: Removing Unfit Leaders — Votes of no confidence, recall, and why we have nothing comparable
Part 4: What Works: Anti-Capture Mechanisms — Campaign finance, lobbying reform, democracy vouchers—what the evidence shows
Part 5: Novel Mechanisms: What Has Been Tried — Citizen assemblies, sortition, direct democracy—where evidence exists
Part 6: The Constitutional Question — You are here
Part 7: A Proposed Framework — How to prioritize reforms—and whether the system can fix itself
← Part 5: Novel Mechanisms: What Has Been Tried | Part 7: A Proposed Framework →
Notes
[^1]: U.S. Constitution, Article V (“no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate”).
[^2]: Ibid., Article V.
[^3]: U.S. National Archives, “Constitutional Amendments,” https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/amendments-11-27
[^4]: Congressional Research Service, “The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation,” 2020, https://www.congress.gov/constitution-annotated/
[^5]: Ellen Carol DuBois, Suffrage: Women’s Long Battle for the Ballot (Oxford University Press, 2020), 112-178.
[^6]: Equal Rights Amendment, H.J. Res. 208, 92nd Congress (1972); National Archives, “Equal Rights Amendment,” https://www.archives.gov/equal-rights-amendment
[^7]: U.S. Constitution, Amendment XVII; Vikram David Amar, “Indirect Effects of Direct Election: The Seventeenth Amendment and Party Competition,” in Congress and the Constitution, ed. Neal Devins and Keith E. Whittington (Oxford University Press, 2005).
[^8]: DuBois, Suffrage, 215-267.
[^9]: U.S. Constitution, Amendment XXII; Michael J. Korzi, “Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers: A Reconsideration of William Howard Taft’s ‘Whig Theory’ of Presidential Leadership,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, no. 4 (2006): 693-717.
[^10]: U.S. Constitution, Amendment XXVI; Thomas J. Knock, “The Seventy-Year Struggle for the Vote,” Journal of American History 98, no. 4 (2012): 1063-1065.
[^11]: Balanced Budget Compact, “State Resolutions Calling for a Convention,” https://www.bba4usa.org/; National Conference of State Legislatures, “Article V Convention Tracker,” https://www.ncsl.org/articles/article-v-convention-tracker
[^12]: U.S. Constitution, Article V.
[^13]: Walter F. Murphy, “Slaughter-House, Civil Rights, and Limits on Constitutional Change,” American Journal of Jurisprudence 32, no. 1 (1987): 1-22; Michael B. Rappaport, “The Constitutionality of a Limited Article V Convention,” Roger Williams University Law Review 20, no. 1 (2015): 1-45.
[^14]: Drew Desilver, “How Does the Electoral College Work?” Pew Research Center, November 4, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/11/04/how-does-the-electoral-college-work/
[^15]: National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/; Edward B. Foley, “The Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote,” Election Law Journal 7, no. 4 (2008): 272-288.
[^16]: U.S. Constitution, Article V.
[^17]: Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 572 U.S. 185 (2014); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
[^18]: Jane J. Mansbridge, Why We Lost the ERA (University of Chicago Press, 1986), 3-45.
[^19]: Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 (HarperCollins, 1988), 232-267.
[^20]: West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Cass R. Sunstein, The Second Bill of Rights: FDR’s Unfinished Revolution and Why We Need It More Than Ever (Basic Books, 2004), 57-89.
[^21]: Permanent Apportionment Act of 1929, 2 U.S.C. § 2a; Kristen D. Burnett, “The House of Representatives: The People’s House?” in The American Congress: The Building of Democracy, ed. Julian E. Zelizer (Houghton Mifflin, 2004), 484-501.