Understanding the mechanics of modern authoritarianism in Latin America
On August 1, 2025, El Salvador’s Legislative Assembly made a decision that shocked the democratic world: they eliminated presidential term limits entirely, paving the way for Nayib Bukele to potentially rule indefinitely.1 This wasn’t a military coup or a constitutional crisis in the traditional sense—it was the culmination of a carefully orchestrated campaign to dismantle democratic institutions from within, all while maintaining overwhelming popular support.
El Salvador’s transformation under Bukele offers a troubling blueprint for how authoritarianism can flourish in the 21st century. By delivering tangible security improvements while systematically capturing democratic institutions, Bukele has shown how charismatic leaders can trade short-term results for long-term democratic erosion. His success raises uncomfortable questions about the resilience of democratic norms when populations face existential challenges.
From Gang Terror to Authoritarian Order
To understand Bukele’s success, one must first grasp the scale of El Salvador’s security crisis. For decades, the tiny Central American nation was terrorized by gangs like MS-13 and Barrio 18, which controlled territories, extorted businesses, and made El Salvador one of the world’s most dangerous countries outside active war zones.2 Homicide rates reached 103 per 100,000 in 2015, with entire neighborhoods becoming no-go zones for civilians and police alike.
Traditional democratic governments had failed spectacularly to address this crisis. Both the right-wing ARENA party and the leftist FMLN had tried various approaches—negotiations, military crackdowns, social programs—but violence continued to ravage Salvadoran society. When Bukele took office in 2019, he inherited a population desperate for any leader who could deliver security.
His solution was the “mano dura” (iron fist) approach taken to unprecedented extremes. In March 2022, following a spike in gang killings, Bukele declared a “state of exception” that suspended constitutional rights including due process, freedom of association, and the right to legal defense.3 This emergency measure, initially intended for 30 days, has been renewed continuously ever since.
The results were immediate and dramatic: homicide rates plummeted from 7.8 per 100,000 in 2022 to just 2.4 per 100,000 in 2023, transforming El Salvador from one of the world’s most dangerous countries to one of the safest in the Americas.4 Over 81,000 people—more than 1% of the entire population—have been arrested, many held in the notorious CECOT mega-prison that has a capacity of 40,000 inmates, though current occupancy is estimated at 15,000-20,000.5
The Institutional Coup
While the world focused on Bukele’s gang crackdown, he was simultaneously executing a more subtle but equally important campaign: the systematic capture of democratic institutions. This began immediately after his Nuevas Ideas party secured a supermajority in the 2021 legislative elections.
On May 1, 2021, the Assembly dismissed five Constitutional Court justices and the Attorney General—the key officials responsible for checking presidential power—replacing them with Bukele loyalists.6 This “constitutional coup” eliminated the primary institutional safeguard against executive overreach. The newly installed Supreme Court then conveniently reinterpreted the constitution to allow Bukele’s re-election, despite clear prohibitions on consecutive presidential terms.
The August 2025 elimination of term limits represents the logical conclusion of this process. With no independent judiciary to constrain him and a rubber-stamp legislature to approve his agenda, Bukele has effectively concentrated all state power in his hands while maintaining the facade of democratic governance.7
Information Warfare in the Digital Age
Bukele’s third pillar of power is his mastery of information control. Unlike traditional authoritarians who simply shut down opposition media, Bukele has created a sophisticated propaganda ecosystem that combines state resources with digital-age tactics.
His government operates a well-funded state media apparatus that produces slick, high-production videos showcasing police raids, the mega-prison, and El Salvador’s transformation.8 Simultaneously, Bukele himself has become perhaps the world’s most social media-savvy head of state, using platforms like X (formerly Twitter) to communicate directly with citizens, announce policies, and attack critics. He has even embraced the title “world’s coolest dictator,” turning potential criticism into a badge of honor.
More insidiously, investigations have revealed the use of Pegasus spyware against journalists and the deployment of extensive bot networks to amplify pro-government messaging and attack critics.9 Independent outlets like El Faro have faced systematic harassment, with reporters accused of being gang collaborators for investigating government policies.
A 2022 “gag law” criminalized reporting on gang activities that could generate “anxiety” or “panic,” effectively silencing critical coverage of the security crackdown.10 By controlling the narrative so comprehensively, Bukele ensures that his version of events—one of unmitigated success—dominates public discourse.
The Latin American Pattern
Bukele’s rise is part of a broader regional trend toward right-wing authoritarianism, though each leader has adapted the playbook to local conditions. In Argentina, Javier Milei won the presidency in 2023 with a similarly anti-establishment message, promising economic “shock therapy” to address Argentina’s chronic inflation and dysfunction.11 Like Bukele, Milei leverages social media to bypass traditional institutions and presents himself as the only leader capable of breaking with a corrupt past.
Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro, who governed from 2019 to 2022, pioneered many of the tactics now associated with Latin American populist authoritarianism. His presidency featured systematic attacks on democratic institutions, the press, and civil society, combined with nostalgic appeals for military rule and promises to restore order through strongman governance.12
What unites these figures is their ability to identify genuine societal problems—gang violence for Bukele, economic crisis for Milei, political corruption for Bolsonaro—and position themselves as the sole actors powerful enough to solve them by circumventing democratic constraints. They share a common communication strategy of direct engagement with supporters via social media, a confrontational relationship with traditional institutions, and a willingness to sacrifice democratic norms for promised results.
The key difference is that Bukele has been the most successful at actually delivering on his promises. While Bolsonaro ultimately lost re-election and Milei faces ongoing economic challenges, Bukele has transformed El Salvador’s security situation so dramatically that his approval ratings remain near 80%.13
Why Authoritarianism Succeeds
The uncomfortable truth revealed by the Bukele model is that authoritarianism can thrive when it delivers tangible benefits to populations facing existential challenges. For most Salvadorans, the trade-off is simple: they can now walk safely in neighborhoods that were previously controlled by gangs, send their children to school without fear, and operate businesses without paying extortion. When measured against these immediate, life-changing improvements, concerns about due process and judicial independence can seem abstract.
This success is amplified by Bukele’s sophisticated propaganda machine, which frames any criticism of his methods as defense of the criminals who once terrorized the population. International human rights organizations, opposition politicians, and independent journalists are portrayed as allies of gangs, making their critiques counterproductive and even harmful to their cause.
The broader enabling factor is the spectacular failure of democratic institutions to address El Salvador’s core challenges over decades. When democratic governments consistently fail to provide basic security—arguably the most fundamental public good—populations become receptive to alternative models that promise effectiveness over process.
This dynamic isn’t unique to El Salvador. Across Latin America and beyond, democratic institutions are struggling to address complex challenges like organized crime, economic inequality, and political corruption. When institutions appear ineffective or captured by special interests, charismatic leaders who promise to cut through democratic “red tape” become increasingly attractive.
Implications for Global Democracy
The Bukele model represents a profound challenge to democratic governance worldwide. It demonstrates how authoritarian consolidation can occur gradually, legally, and with popular support when leaders successfully address genuine public needs that democratic institutions have failed to meet.
This creates a dangerous template for aspiring authoritarians: identify a serious problem that democratic institutions have struggled to solve, promise dramatic solutions that require circumventing democratic constraints, deliver enough short-term results to maintain popularity, and then systematically dismantle the institutional safeguards that could challenge your power.
The model’s appeal extends beyond Latin America. Right-wing leaders across the globe are studying Bukele’s success, particularly his ability to maintain high approval ratings while concentrating power. His methods offer a roadmap for democratic erosion that appears less threatening than traditional military coups but may be even more effective at consolidating authoritarian rule.
Perhaps most troubling is how the Bukele model exploits genuine democratic shortcomings. His rise wasn’t simply the result of demagoguery or manipulation—it reflected real failures of democratic governance to address existential challenges facing ordinary citizens. This suggests that defending democracy requires more than just protecting institutions; it demands that democratic systems actually deliver on their promises of effective, accountable governance.
The Price of Order
As El Salvador moves toward potential permanent rule by Bukele, the full cost of this transformation is becoming clear. While streets may be safer, the country has effectively abandoned constitutional democracy, press freedom, and the rule of law. Over 85,000 people remain imprisoned, many without trial, human rights organizations document widespread abuse, and civil society has been largely silenced.14
The international community faces a difficult challenge in responding to the Bukele model. Traditional diplomatic pressure and democracy promotion tools seem inadequate when dealing with a leader who maintains genuine popular support and has delivered measurable improvements in security. Sanctioning a government that most of its citizens support risks appearing hypocritical and may actually strengthen the regime’s narrative of international persecution.
The Bukele case ultimately poses fundamental questions about the relationship between democracy and effective governance. If democratic institutions consistently fail to address existential challenges, can they maintain legitimacy? How should democratic societies respond when populations willingly trade political freedoms for security and stability?
As other nations grapple with their own governance challenges—from rising crime rates to economic inequality to political polarization—the Bukele model offers a seductive but dangerous alternative. His success serves as both a warning about democracy’s vulnerabilities and a reminder that democratic institutions must prove their worth through effective governance, not just adherence to procedural norms.
The ultimate test of El Salvador’s transformation will come in the years ahead, as the country discovers whether authoritarian order can be sustained over time and whether the price paid for security was worth the democratic freedoms sacrificed. For the rest of the world, the challenge is learning from Bukele’s success while strengthening democratic institutions to ensure they can address urgent public needs without abandoning the principles that make them worth preserving.
References
- Associated Press. “Bukele’s party changes El Salvador constitution in expansion of presidential power.” AP News, August 1, 2025. https://apnews.com/article/el-salvador-nayib-bukele-reelection-f9efd1a08d3c9de2f886f7b911b9417d
- Bergengruen, V. “How Nayib Bukele’s ‘Iron Fist’ Has Transformed El Salvador.” TIME, August 29, 2024. https://time.com/7015598/nayib-bukeles-iron-fist-el-salvador/
- Human Rights Watch. “El Salvador: Broad ‘State of Emergency’ Risks Abuse.” March 29, 2022. https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/29/el-salvador-broad-state-emergency-risks-abuse-0
- InSight Crime. “InSight Crime’s 2022 Homicide Round-Up” and Reuters. “El Salvador says murders fell 70% in 2023 as it cracked down on gangs.” January 3, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/el-salvador-says-murders-fell-70-2023-it-cracked-down-gangs-2024-01-03/
- Reuters. “What is El Salvador’s mega-prison that could take US criminals?” February 4, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/what-is-el-salvadors-mega-prison-that-could-take-us-criminals-2025-02-04/
- Washington Office on Latin America. “El Salvador’s Constitutional Crisis: The Dismissal of Supreme Court Justices and the Attorney General.” 2021. https://www.wola.org/analysis/el-salvador-constitutional-crisis-supreme-court-attorney-general/
- The Economist. “Nayib Bukele could now rule El Salvador for life.” August 2, 2025. https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2025/08/02/nayib-bukele-could-now-rule-el-salvador-for-life
- El País. “Nayib Bukele consolidates his authoritarian style in El Salvador.” May 19, 2025. https://english.elpais.com/international/2025-05-19/nayib-bukele-consolidates-his-authoritarian-style-in-el-salvador.html
- Committee to Protect Journalists. “El Salvador uses Pegasus spyware to spy on journalists.” 2024. https://cpj.org/2024/02/el-salvador-uses-pegasus-spyware-to-spy-on-journalists/
- Al Jazeera. “El Salvador NGOs challenge criminalisation of gang reporting.” April 20, 2022. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/20/el-salvador-ngos-take-on-gag-order-on-gang-statements
- The Guardian. “Argentina presidential election: far-right libertarian Javier Milei wins after rival concedes.” November 20, 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/19/javier-milei-wins-argentina-presidential-election
- Human Rights Watch. “World Report 2022: Brazil.” 2022. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/brazil
- Multiple polls cited by El País and Reuters place approval in 75-90% range in 2024-25.
- Human Rights Watch. “World Report 2025: El Salvador.” 2025. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/el-salvador