Geofence Warrants – Part 6: The Coming Precedent
On April 27, the Supreme Court will hear arguments in Chatrie v. United States. The decision will not just determine whether geofence warrants are constitutional. It will define the Fourth Amendment’s relationship with mass digital surveillance for a generation.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Chatrie v. United States on January 16, 2026.[1] The question presented cuts to the heart of the Fourth Amendment’s application to digital surveillance:
> Whether the Fourth Amendment requires police to have probable cause tied to a specific individual before obtaining a reverse-location (geofence) warrant from Google.[2]
This is not a narrow question. The answer will determine whether the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement—the principle that the government must identify who it’s searching before it searches—applies to digital databases, or whether the scale and architecture of those databases render the particularity requirement obsolete.
The decision, expected by early summer 2026, will resolve the “Grand Canyon” circuit split between the Fourth and Fifth Circuits. But its implications extend far beyond geofence warrants. Every technology that enables mass surveillance—drone networks, facial recognition systems, Internet of Things data aggregation, AI-powered predictive policing—raises the same structural question: can the government search everyone first and identify suspects later, or does the Fourth Amendment require individualized suspicion before the search begins?
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The Amicus Landscape
The amicus briefs filed in Chatrie reveal the breadth of the constitutional stakes. This is not a case that interests only criminal defense lawyers and privacy advocates. It has drawn briefs from press freedom organizations, civil liberties groups, law enforcement, and constitutional scholars—each identifying different aspects of the constitutional problem.
Knight First Amendment Institute, FIRE, and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press filed jointly on March 2, 2026, arguing that geofence warrants threaten First Amendment activity including newsgathering, political association, and religious exercise.[3] Their brief urged the Court to apply the Fourth Amendment with “special rigor” when surveillance threatens First Amendment rights—a principle the Court has recognized but not always applied consistently.[4] “If the government can use location data to indiscriminately and retroactively identify every person who met with a reporter, attended a protest, or visited a place of worship,” the Knight Institute’s Nicola Morrow wrote, “it creates a serious risk of chilling lawful speech and association.”[5]
The Institute for Justice filed separately, arguing that the multi-step geofence warrant process violates the particularity requirement and constitutes a modern-day general warrant.[6] The Institute drew an explicit analogy to the writs of assistance that the Framers targeted with the Fourth Amendment—general warrants that allowed British colonial officials to search any place and seize any person without particularized suspicion.[7]
The Brennan Center for Justice, Center for Democracy and Technology, Surveillance Technology Oversight Project, and Defending Rights & Dissent filed jointly, urging the Court to find geofence warrants unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.[8]
The Constitutional Accountability Center filed an amicus brief urging reversal of the Fourth Circuit’s decision, explaining why the Fourth Amendment applies to geofence warrants and why such warrants fail the particularity requirement.[9]
Professor Orin Kerr filed an amicus brief on April 2, 2026, raising concerns about the scope of the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning.[10] Kerr has argued that while the Fifth Circuit reached the right outcome, its particularity analysis could be read to invalidate any digital warrant for online data—a consequence that would extend far beyond geofence warrants to any search of a large database.
The Department of Justice filed its merits brief on March 25, 2026, urging the Court to uphold the legality of geofence warrants, arguing that they are “fully consistent with the Constitution” as legitimate law enforcement tools.[11] The DOJ’s position deserves engagement on its merits, not dismissal. The government argues that the warrant process—with its judicial oversight and probable cause requirement—provides sufficient constitutional protection, and that requiring individualized probable cause before a geofence warrant would effectively eliminate a valuable investigative technique, particularly for crimes where no suspect has been identified and no other leads exist. The DOJ also emphasizes that geofence warrants are subject to judicial scrutiny before issuance, distinguishing them from the warrantless searches that concerned the Carpenter Court.
The strength of the DOJ’s position lies in its institutional argument: courts should not take the extraordinary step of categorically banning an investigative technique when a less restrictive alternative—enhanced judicial oversight of geofence warrant scope—could address constitutional concerns while preserving law enforcement utility. The weakness of the DOJ’s position, as the Harvard Law Review identified, is that “probable cause can nearly always be shown in the geofence context,” making enhanced oversight an unreliable constitutional safeguard.[11a]
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The Justices: Prior Writings and Possible Approaches
Predicting Supreme Court outcomes is inherently uncertain. Justices sometimes surprise, form unexpected coalitions, or narrow their ruling to avoid the hardest questions. What follows is not a prediction of votes but an assessment of what the justices’ prior writings suggest about possible approaches to the constitutional questions in Chatrie.
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the Carpenter majority, narrowly distinguishing CSLI from other location data. His opinion emphasized the “detailed, encyclopedic” nature of CSLI and the fact that it is collected passively. His prior writing suggests possible sympathy for extending Carpenter to geofence warrants, but his narrow framing in Carpenter—explicitly cabining the ruling to CSLI—also suggests caution about broad pronouncements that could unsettle large areas of law enforcement practice.[12]
Justice Thomas wrote a concurrence in Carpenter signaling willingness to reconsider the third-party doctrine entirely. Thomas argued that the third-party doctrine is inconsistent with original meaning and that property-based approaches to the Fourth Amendment may be more appropriate for digital data.[13] His prior writing suggests he could support restricting geofence warrants on grounds that don’t require extending Carpenter—but reaching that conclusion would require accepting property-based reasoning that the Court has not yet adopted.
Justice Gorsuch dissented in Carpenter, criticizing the majority for creating new privacy rights through judicial fiat rather than grounding the decision in property or traditional legal doctrines. Gorsuch’s dissent suggested that legislative solutions, not judicial innovation, should address digital surveillance.[14] His emphasis on property rights could support restricting geofence warrants—but could also support deferring to legislative action rather than judicially mandating restrictions.
Justice Alito dissented in Carpenter on the ground that the majority’s reasoning was unprincipled and would create confusion. Alito emphasized the need for legislative solutions to digital surveillance questions and expressed concern about judicial overreach.[15] His prior writing suggests he would be most receptive to the DOJ’s argument that courts should defer to the legislative process rather than categorically restricting an investigative technique.
Justice Sotomayor has been consistently protective of Fourth Amendment rights in digital surveillance cases. Her concurrence in United States v. Jones (2012) argued that GPS tracking constitutes a search not because of physical trespass but because of the privacy interests at stake.[16] Her prior writing suggests she would favor extending Fourth Amendment protection to geofence warrants, though the specific doctrinal path remains uncertain.
Justice Kagan joined the Carpenter majority and has generally been sympathetic to privacy arguments in digital surveillance contexts. Her questions at oral argument may reveal whether she favors a categorical rule or a framework that allows geofence warrants with restrictions.
Justice Kavanaugh joined the Carpenter majority but has also emphasized the importance of law enforcement interests. His vote may turn on whether he views geofence warrants as a reasonable adaptation of traditional warrant practice or a fundamental departure from the particularity requirement.
Justice Barrett has not written extensively on digital surveillance but has shown interest in originalist approaches to the Fourth Amendment. The historical question—whether geofence warrants are analogous to writs of assistance or to traditional warrants—may be decisive for her approach.
Justice Jackson has not participated in a major Fourth Amendment digital surveillance case. Her approach is uncertain.
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Three Possible Outcomes
Supreme Court outcomes are inherently unpredictable. Justices sometimes surprise, form unexpected coalitions, or narrow their ruling to avoid the hardest questions. The three outcomes below are not predictions—they are analytical frameworks for understanding what different rulings would mean for the Fourth Amendment and for law enforcement.
Outcome 1: Overrule the Fourth Circuit (Individualized Probable Cause Required)
The Court holds that geofence warrants require probable cause tied to a specific individual before the government can search a location database. This would dramatically restrict geofence warrant use—the government would need to identify a suspect first, then seek location data about that person, rather than searching everyone and generating suspects from the results.
Implications: 11,500+ warrants per year would require individualized probable cause, effectively ending the “search everyone first” model. Law enforcement would need to rely on traditional investigative methods to identify suspects before seeking location data. Geofence warrants in their current form would cease to exist.
This outcome would require extending Carpenter beyond its current narrow holding, which the Court has been reluctant to do. But it would align with the Fifth Circuit’s concern about general warrants and the original meaning of the particularity requirement.
Outcome 2: Affirm the Fourth Circuit (Warrant Requirement Satisfied)
The Court holds that the warrant process itself—with judicial oversight and a probable cause finding that evidence of a crime exists in the area—provides sufficient constitutional protection. Geofence warrants continue in their current form.
Implications: Law enforcement continues widespread use. The constitutional question is resolved in favor of the government, but the policy problems—innocent bystanders, scope limits, protest surveillance—remain unaddressed by the courts and fall to legislatures.
This outcome would effectively overrule the Fifth Circuit and ratify the “search everyone first” model—a result that is difficult to square with the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement as historically understood, but which could be justified on the ground that the warrant process itself provides constitutional protection.
Outcome 3: The Middle Ground (Narrowing Requirements)
The Court holds that geofence warrants are constitutionally permissible but with significant restrictions: narrow geographic and temporal scope, exhaustion of alternative methods, or heightened judicial scrutiny of the geofence’s breadth.
Implications: Geofence warrants continue but in a more restricted form. The specific requirements would depend on the majority’s framework—exhaustion requirements, scope limits, notice provisions, or particularity standards. This is the outcome most consistent with the Court’s typical approach to new technology: neither banning it nor giving it a blank check.
The risk, as the Harvard Law Review identified, is that probable cause–based requirements may be too easy to satisfy to function as meaningful limits.[17] A middle ground that collapses into unqualified authorization would be worse than a clear rule—because it would provide the appearance of constitutional protection without the substance.
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Beyond Geofence: The Broader Stakes
The Supreme Court’s decision in Chatrie will set a precedent that extends far beyond geofence warrants. The same structural question—whether the government can search a large database of personal information without individualized suspicion—arises whenever new surveillance technology enables mass data collection.
Drone surveillance. A network of drones equipped with cameras and tracking technology could enable persistent aerial surveillance of entire cities. If the government can search Google’s location database without individualized suspicion, can it search a drone surveillance database under the same logic?[18]
Facial recognition. Systems like Clearview AI aggregate billions of facial images from social media and the internet. A “reverse face warrant”—searching a facial recognition database for everyone who was near a crime scene—would raise the same particularity question as a geofence warrant, applied to visual rather than location data.[19]
Internet of Things. As more devices collect and transmit data—smart speakers, fitness trackers, connected cars, home security cameras—the databases available to law enforcement will grow larger and more comprehensive. The particularity question will arise every time the government seeks to search one of these databases without identifying a specific suspect first.
AI-powered surveillance. Artificial intelligence makes it possible to analyze surveillance data at scale—identifying patterns, tracking individuals across multiple data sources, and generating investigative leads from mass data collection. The more powerful AI becomes, the more valuable mass databases become, and the greater the constitutional pressure on the particularity requirement.
First Amendment implications. The Knight Institute’s amicus brief raised a concern that deserves separate attention: geofence warrants can reveal who attended a protest, visited a place of worship, met with a journalist, or sought medical care. When surveillance tools can identify constitutionally protected activity, the Supreme Court has historically applied “special rigor” to the Fourth Amendment analysis.[18a] The Court’s decisions in Stanford v. Texas (1965) and Zurcher v. Stanford Daily (1978) recognized that search warrants targeting press materials and expressive activity require heightened scrutiny. If geofence warrants can identify protesters, congregants, and journalists’ sources without individualized suspicion, they may fail under this more demanding standard even if they would survive ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis.
International comparison. The European Union’s approach to location data under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) offers a contrasting framework. Under GDPR, location data is classified as personal data subject to strict processing limitations, purpose restrictions, and individual rights including the right to access, rectify, and erase.[18b] EU member states require judicial authorization for law enforcement access to location data, but the authorization standard typically demands individualized suspicion rather than geographic proximity alone. The EU approach does not resolve the Fourth Amendment question—the Constitution sets a floor, not a ceiling, for privacy protection—but it demonstrates that a regulatory framework limiting mass location surveillance is practically achievable. The question is whether the Fourth Amendment itself demands something similar.
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The Amicus Landscape: Who’s Weighing In
The Chatrie case has attracted an unusually large and diverse amicus coalition—more than 29 amicus briefs filed across the ideological spectrum, revealing how broadly the geofence warrant question cuts across traditional political and institutional lines.
On the civil liberties side, the Knight First Amendment Institute, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, and FIRE filed a joint brief arguing that geofence warrants threaten First Amendment-protected activity—protests, newsgathering, and religious assembly.[19] The Electronic Frontier Foundation filed separately, arguing that the third-party doctrine cannot justify mass surveillance of location data. The Center for Democracy and Technology, the Surveillance Technology Oversight Project, the Brennan Center, and Defending Rights & Dissent filed jointly urging the Court to find geofence warrants unconstitutional. The Liberty Justice Center and the New Civil Liberties Alliance filed separately, each arguing that geofence warrants violate the particularity requirement. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund raised concerns about the disproportionate impact of geofence warrants on communities of color, where over-policed neighborhoods mean more geofence warrants and more innocent people swept into investigations.[20] EPIC filed an amicus brief arguing that geofence searches constitute Fourth Amendment searches for the same reasons as the government’s search in Carpenter.^[20a]
On the law enforcement side, a bipartisan coalition of 32 state attorneys general, led by Iowa and Michigan, filed an amicus brief on April 1, 2026 urging the Court to uphold the constitutionality of geofence warrants.[20h] The coalition—spanning Alabama to New York, Texas to Washington—argued that geofence warrants are “a critical tool for law enforcement” subject to existing Fourth Amendment safeguards. The National Association of Police Organizations and the Major Cities Chiefs Association filed briefs supporting the government, emphasizing geofence warrants’ utility in solving violent crimes and the absence of alternative investigative tools when suspects are unknown.[21] The Department of Justice, in its merits brief filed March 25, 2026, argued that geofence warrants are a “reasonable adaptation of traditional warrant process to digital-age evidence” and that categorical prohibition would impair law enforcement’s ability to investigate crimes with no known suspects.[22]
Google LLC filed an amicus brief in support of neither party on March 2, 2026, marking a significant evolution in the company’s posture: from building the infrastructure that enabled mass geofence warrants, to objecting to over 3,000 such warrants on constitutional grounds, to urging the Court to recognize Fourth Amendment protection for cloud-stored location data.^[20b] Google argued that Location History data constitutes the user’s “papers” protected by the Fourth Amendment—not ordinary business records—and that after Carpenter, there can be “little question” that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their physical movements.^[20c] The company’s filing is particularly notable because it comes from the entity that was the primary target of geofence warrants; its constitutional opposition represents a corporate evolution that itself underscores the case for judicial rather than corporate resolution.
X Corp. filed an amicus brief on August 29, 2025, before certiorari was granted, arguing that geofence warrants threaten user privacy and platform integrity.^[20d] The Project for Privacy and Surveillance Accountability filed separately at the same time.^[20e]
On the libertarian and conservative side, Americans for Prosperity Foundation and NetChoice filed amicus briefs on March 2, 2026, arguing from a property-rights and regulatory-overreach perspective that the government’s mass data collection exceeds constitutional limits.^[20f] The Institute for Justice, as discussed above, analogized geofence warrants to writs of assistance.
In the academic middle ground, Professor Orin Kerr filed a brief arguing that neither categorical prohibition nor blanket authorization is correct—instead, the Court should evaluate geofence warrants based on what the government actually obtains, not what it theoretically searches.[23] Several Fourth Amendment scholars, including Professor Megan Graham, filed a brief proposing a scope-based framework that would permit narrow geofence warrants while prohibiting broad ones.[24] A coalition of eight law professors filed on March 2, 2026, offering a doctrinal analysis of the particularity question.^[20g]
A coalition of 32 state attorneys general, led by Iowa and Michigan, filed an amicus brief on April 1, 2026 urging the Court to uphold the constitutionality of geofence warrants.^[20h] This is not a minor filing: the coalition spans the partisan spectrum, from Alabama and Texas to New York and the District of Columbia, all arguing that geofence warrants are “a critical tool for law enforcement” subject to longstanding Fourth Amendment protections including probable cause, particularity, and judicial approval.^[20i] The breadth of this coalition—32 states spanning red, blue, and purple—is striking. It demonstrates that law enforcement’s reliance on geofence warrants is not a partisan position but an institutional one: state prosecutors across the country have come to depend on this investigative technique and are asking the Court not to eliminate it. The coalition’s brief does not argue for unlimited geofence warrants but contends that the Constitution does not ban new investigative methods, and that courts must evaluate whether each warrant meets established constitutional standards rather than imposing categorical prohibitions.^[20j]
Microsoft Corporation filed an amicus brief in support of neither party on March 9, 2026, arguing that the Court should establish clear warrant requirements if geofence warrants are not categorically unconstitutional.^[20k] Microsoft’s filing is significant as one of the largest cloud service providers, joining Google in acknowledging constitutional concerns while stopping short of arguing for categorical prohibition.^[20l]
The Software & Information Industry Association (SIIA) and the Computer & Communications Industry Association (CCIA) filed jointly in support of neither party on March 9, 2026, representing major technology trade associations.^[20m] Their brief argued that if geofence warrants are permitted, the Court should establish clear warrant requirements—including that the Court should evaluate geofence warrants based on what the government actually obtains, not what it theoretically searches.
The American Center for Law and Justice, the Rutherford Institute, and James W. Harper filed separately on March 9, 2026, each in support of neither party.^[20n] The Policing Project at New York University School of Law also filed on March 9, 2026, offering a regulatory framework perspective on how geofence warrants could be constitutionally structured.^[20o] The Local Government Legal Center filed on April 1, 2026, representing local government interests in the outcome.^[20p]
The breadth of the amicus coalition underscores the significance of the case: this is not a narrow technical question about a single investigative tool. It is a fundamental question about how the Fourth Amendment applies to mass digital surveillance—and the answer will shape constitutional law for decades.
The Fifth Circuit’s holding—that a database can be “too big to search” constitutionally—is the most aggressive answer to this structural problem. If the Supreme Court affirms that principle, it creates a constitutional framework for evaluating any mass digital surveillance technique. If it rejects that principle, it leaves the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement increasingly irrelevant as databases grow larger and surveillance tools become more powerful.
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The Framers’ Question
The Supreme Court will decide Chatrie in a context the Framers could not have anticipated but a principle they understood well. The Fourth Amendment was enacted in direct response to the British use of general warrants and writs of assistance—tools that allowed government agents to search any place and seize any person without particularized suspicion. The Framers’ experience with general warrants was not abstract. It was the lived experience of colonial subjects subjected to arbitrary government search.
Geofence warrants are not writs of assistance in the literal sense. They require judicial approval, probable cause, and a warrant signed by a judge—procedural safeguards that the writs of assistance entirely lacked. The government has emphasized these procedural differences in urging the Court to uphold geofence warrants. But they share a structural feature with general warrants that the Framers found intolerable: they authorize the government to search everyone in a defined area without knowing who it is looking for, and to generate suspects from the search results rather than identifying suspects before the search begins.
Whether that structural similarity is constitutionally significant is the question the Supreme Court will answer. The answer will define the Fourth Amendment’s relationship with mass digital surveillance for a generation—and determine whether the constitutional protection against general warrants survives the transition from parchment to pixels.
One thing is certain: whatever the Court decides, the technological capabilities that make geofence warrants possible will continue to evolve. New databases will be built. New surveillance tools will be developed. New techniques for searching mass data without individualized suspicion will emerge. The Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement was written for a world of physical searches and individualized warrants. The question the Court must answer is whether that requirement can adapt to a world of mass databases and algorithmic surveillance—or whether the Constitution’s protection against general warrants, like the parchment on which it was written, belongs to a different era.
The answer will arrive by early summer. The consequences will last much longer.
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Notes
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*Chatrie v. United States*, No. 25-112 (U.S., cert. granted Jan. 16, 2026). See SCOTUSblog, https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/case-files/chatrie-v-united-states/; Justia, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/2025/25-112/. ↩
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*Chatrie v. United States*, Question Presented, No. 25-112 (U.S. 2026). ↩
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Knight First Amendment Institute, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, and FIRE, Amicus Brief in *Chatrie v. United States* (Mar. 2, 2026), https://knightcolumbia.org/documents/avogw49zgx. ↩
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See, e.g., *Zurcher v. Stanford Daily*, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (recognizing the need for Fourth Amendment protection of press materials); see also *Stanford v. Texas*, 379 U.S. 476 (1965) (applying heightened scrutiny to search warrants targeting expressive materials). ↩
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Knight Institute press statement (Mar. 2, 2026), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/knight-institute-reporters-committee-and-fire-urge-supreme-court-to-reject-dragnet-geofence-warrants (quoting Nicola Morrow). ↩
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Institute for Justice, Amicus Brief in *Chatrie v. United States* (Mar. 2, 2026), https://ij.org/amicus/chatrie-v-united-states/. ↩
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Id. (analogizing geofence warrants to writs of assistance). ↩
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Brennan Center for Justice, Amicus Brief in *Chatrie v. United States*, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/okello-chatrie-v-united-states-america. ↩
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Constitutional Accountability Center, Amicus Brief in *Chatrie v. United States* (Mar. 2026), https://www.theusconstitution.org/litigation/chatrie-v-united-states/. ↩
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Orin Kerr, “My Amicus Brief in the Geofence Warrant Case, United States v. Chatrie,” Volokh Conspiracy, *Reason* (Apr. 2, 2026), https://reason.com/volokh/2026/04/02/my-amicus-brief-in-the-geofence-warrant-case-united-states-v-chatrie/. ↩
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“DOJ Urges Supreme Court to Uphold Legality of Geofence Warrants,” *MSN* (2026), https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/technology/doj-urges-supreme-court-to-uphold-legality-of-geofence-warrants/ar-AA1ZsOVt. ↩
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*Carpenter v. United States*, 585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (majority opinion by Roberts, C.J.). ↩
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*Carpenter*, 138 S. Ct. at 2262 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing for reconsideration of the third-party doctrine). ↩
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*Carpenter*, 138 S. Ct. at 2273 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for judicial creation of privacy rights and suggesting property-based approaches). ↩
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*Carpenter*, 138 S. Ct. at 2261 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing for legislative rather than judicial solutions to digital surveillance questions). ↩
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*United States v. Jones*, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (arguing that GPS tracking constitutes a search based on privacy interests, not physical trespass). ↩
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“Much Ado About Geofence Warrants,” *Harvard Law Review* (Feb. 2025), https://harvardlawreview.org/blog/2025/02/much-ado-about-geofence-warrants/ (arguing that probable cause–based middle grounds would “collapse into the Fourth Circuit’s unqualified authorization” because probable cause can nearly always be shown in the geofence context). ↩
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See, e.g., *Carpenter*, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (noting that the ruling does not address “conventional surveillance techniques” or “digital-era surveillance tools and techniques” beyond CSLI). ↩
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See generally Kashmir Hill, “The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It,” *New York Times* (Jan. 18, 2020) (describing Clearview AI’s facial recognition database of billions of images). ↩
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NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Amicus Brief in *Chatrie v. United States* (Mar. 2, 2026) (raising disparate impact concerns regarding geofence warrant deployment in over-policed communities). ↩
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National Association of Police Organizations and Major Cities Chiefs Association, Amicus Brief in *Chatrie v. United States* (Mar. 2026) (emphasizing geofence warrants’ utility in solving violent crimes with no known suspects). ↩
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Brief for the United States, *Chatrie v. United States*, No. 25-112 (U.S. Mar. 25, 2026) (arguing that geofence warrants represent a “reasonable adaptation of traditional warrant process to digital-age evidence”); see also “DOJ Urges Supreme Court to Uphold Legality of Geofence Warrants,” *MSN* (2026), https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/technology/doj-urges-supreme-court-to-uphold-legality-of-geofence-warrants/ar-AA1ZsOVt. ↩
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Brief of Professor Orin S. Kerr as Amicus Curiae in *Chatrie v. United States*, No. 25-112 (U.S. Apr. 1, 2026), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-112/403349/20260401133909957_25-112acProfessorOrinSKerr.pdf. ↩
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Brief of Fourth Amendment Scholars as Amici Curiae in *Chatrie v. United States*, No. 25-112 (U.S. 2026) (proposing scope-based framework for evaluating geofence warrants). ↩
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“Much Ado About Geofence Warrants,” *Harvard Law Review* (Feb. 2025), https://harvardlawreview.org/blog/2025/02/much-ado-about-geofence-warrants/ (arguing that probable cause can nearly always be shown in the geofence context, making enhanced judicial oversight an unreliable safeguard). ↩
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*Stanford v. Texas*, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) (“The constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press … has meaning and purpose only if it encompasses the right to distribute and receive ideas.”); *Zurcher v. Stanford Daily*, 436 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1978) (recognizing heightened scrutiny for search warrants targeting press materials). ↩
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Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation), Arts. 4, 6, 9, and 17; see also Directive (EU) 2016/680 (Law Enforcement Directive), Art. 8(2) (requiring that processing of personal data for law enforcement purposes be “necessary and proportionate” and specifying that automated processing of location data requires safeguards). ↩
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Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), Amicus Brief in *Chatrie v. United States* (Mar. 2, 2026), https://epic.org/documents/chatrie-v-united-states/ (arguing that geofence searches are Fourth Amendment searches for the same reasons as the government’s search in *Carpenter* and that geofence warrants are unconstitutional general warrants). ↩
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Brief for Amicus Curiae Google LLC in Support of Neither Party, *Chatrie v. United States*, No. 25-112 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2026), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-112/399674/20260302134430681_25-112%20Google%20Chatrie%20Amicus.final.pdf. ↩
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Id. at 3–4 (arguing that “Individuals’ documents and data stored electronically and securely in remote servers are the modern-day ‘papers[] and effects’ protected by the Fourth Amendment” and that Location History was “often more precise and more comprehensive than the cell-site location information at issue in *Carpenter*”). ↩
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Brief Amicus Curiae of X Corp., *Chatrie v. United States*, No. 25-112 (U.S. Aug. 29, 2025), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-112/373265/20250829160043957_Chatrie%20-%20AC%20Brief_final.pdf. ↩
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Brief Amicus Curiae of Project for Privacy & Surveillance Accountability, Inc., *Chatrie v. United States*, No. 25-112 (U.S. Aug. 29, 2025), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-112/373276/20250829194222669_25-112%20SCOTUS%20Amicus%20Brief%20of%20PPSA%202025.08.29.pdf. ↩
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Brief of Americans for Prosperity Foundation as Amicus Curiae, *Chatrie v. United States*, No. 25-112 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2026), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-112/399672/20260302134355393_2026.3.2.AFPF%20Amicus.Chatrie%20v.%20United%20States.25.112.pdf; Brief of NetChoice as Amicus Curiae, *Chatrie v. United States*, No. 25-112 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2026). ↩
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Brief of Eight Law Professors as Amici Curiae, *Chatrie v. United States*, No. 25-112 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2026), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-112/399683/20260302135902733_2026-03-01_Chatrie_AmicusBrief_FINAL.pdf. ↩
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Brief of Iowa, Michigan, and 32 State Attorneys General as Amici Curiae, *Chatrie v. United States*, No. 25-112 (U.S. Apr. 1, 2026), https://www.michigan.gov/ag/-/media/Project/Websites/AG/releases/2026/April/Chatrie-v-US-Amicus-Final.pdf; see also Michigan AG Press Release (Apr. 2, 2026), https://www.michigan.gov/ag/news/press-releases/2026/04/02/ag-nessel-leads-bipartisan-coalition-defending-use-of-geofence-warrants-by-law-enforcement. ↩
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Id. (“Without access to this critical technology, countless violent crimes may go unsolved, undoubtedly making our communities less safe and denying justice to victims.”). Joining Iowa and Michigan: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Washington. ↩
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Id. (arguing that “the Constitution does not ban new investigative methods” and that “courts must evaluate whether each warrant meets established constitutional standards” rather than imposing categorical prohibitions). ↩
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Brief Amicus Curiae of Microsoft Corporation in Support of Neither Party, *Chatrie v. United States*, No. 25-112 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2026), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-112/400444/20260309173458631_25-112%20ac%20Microsoft%20Corporation.pdf. ↩
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Id. (arguing that if geofence warrants are not categorically unconstitutional, the Court should establish clear warrant requirements). ↩
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Brief Amici Curiae of Software & Information Industry Association and Computer & Communications Industry Association in Support of Neither Party, *Chatrie v. United States*, No. 25-112 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2026), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-112/400442/20260309172600756_25-112.brief.pdf. ↩
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Brief Amicus Curiae of American Center for Law and Justice in Support of Neither Party, *Chatrie v. United States*, No. 25-112 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2026); Brief Amicus Curiae of The Rutherford Institute in Support of Neither Party, No. 25-112 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2026); Brief Amicus Curiae of James W. Harper in Support of Neither Party, No. 25-112 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2026). ↩
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Brief Amicus Curiae of The Policing Project at New York University School of Law in Support of Neither Party, *Chatrie v. United States*, No. 25-112 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2026). ↩
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Brief Amici Curiae of Local Government Legal Center in Support of Neither Party, *Chatrie v. United States*, No. 25-112 (U.S. Apr. 1, 2026). ↩