Geofence Warrants – Part 4: The Scale Problem
In 2020, Google received 11,554 geofence warrants. Each one searched hundreds of millions of devices to find suspects who didn’t know they were being looked for. There are no statutory limits on how big the net can be.
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The constitutional questions raised by geofence warrants—the particularity requirement, the third-party doctrine, the meaning of voluntary disclosure—are abstract enough to feel academic. The scale of their use is not.
In 2018, Google received 982 geofence warrant requests from law enforcement.[1] In 2019, that number jumped to 8,396—an increase of more than 750 percent in a single year.[2] In 2020, it reached 11,554.[3] By 2021, geofence warrants accounted for approximately 25 percent of all law enforcement data requests Google received.[4] A single investigative technique, directed at a single company, was generating one quarter of all government demands for user data.
These numbers come from Google’s own transparency reports—the only systematic data available on geofence warrant volume. No federal agency tracks geofence warrant use. No statute requires disclosure of how many are issued, how broad their geographic scope, or how many innocent people are identified and investigated as a result. The constitutional debate over geofence warrants takes place against a background of near-total informational opacity about their actual deployment.
What we know is alarming. What we don’t know is worse.
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Who Uses Geofence Warrants—and For What
Geofence warrants have been used to investigate the full range of criminal activity: robberies, burglaries, drug crimes, homicides, arsons, sexual assaults.[5] They are not limited to violent crime or federal investigations. The majority of geofence warrants come from state and local law enforcement agencies, not federal ones.[6]
The breadth of use matters because constitutional analysis often turns on the gravity of the government’s interest. The Supreme Court has historically been more willing to allow intrusive investigative techniques when the crime is serious and the technique is necessary. Geofence warrants, as actually deployed, are used to investigate routine crimes where traditional investigative methods—CCTV, witness interviews, physical surveillance—might also work but are more labor-intensive.[7]
There is no statutory requirement that law enforcement exhaust traditional investigative methods before seeking a geofence warrant. California is an exception: state law requires a judicial finding that alternative investigative methods have been exhausted or are insufficient.[8] But most states impose no such requirement, and no federal statute addresses the question at all.
The result is that geofence warrants function as a convenience tool: rather than investigating the old-fashioned way, police can serve a warrant on Google and receive a list of potential suspects within days. When the constitutional alternative requires substantially more effort, the path of least resistance is also the path of maximum surveillance.
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The Innocent Bystanders: Documented Cases
The cases where geofence warrants identify innocent people are not hypothetical. They are documented in court records, news reporting, and amicus briefs filed in Chatrie.
The cyclist. A man riding his bike on a public path near a burglarized home was identified through a geofence warrant because his phone’s location data placed him in the geofence during the time window. Police questioned him as a suspect. He had no connection to the crime and was eventually cleared—but only after being drawn into a criminal investigation because he chose to ride his bike on a public path.[9]
The protest attendee. During the summer of 2020, law enforcement agencies across the country obtained location data for thousands of individuals involved in largely peaceful protests, using geofence warrants that covered the areas where demonstrations occurred.[10] The Knight First Amendment Institute, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, and FIRE documented these deployments in their March 2026 amicus brief, warning that “geofence warrants make it impossible to assemble, protest, newsgather, worship, and more away from the government’s watchful eye.”[11]
The employee near a crime scene. A restaurant employee working a shift near a robbery was identified because her phone placed her in the geofence during the crime window. She became a suspect despite having no connection to the robbery, and was only cleared when her employer provided her alibi.[12]
The journalist’s source. The Knight Institute brief raises the concern most directly: geofence warrants can identify who met with a reporter. “Few investigative tools are more invasive than those that allow the government to identify who met with a reporter,” the Reporters Committee wrote. “There are longstanding safeguards designed to prevent law enforcement from intruding on confidential newsgathering because those intrusions endanger sources and impair public interest reporting. Dragnet location searches bypass those protections.”[13]
These are the cases we know about. They emerged from court records, investigative reporting, and amicus briefs. But there is no systematic tracking of how many innocent people are identified through geofence warrants each year. Google does not disclose how many people are swept up in Step 1 of the process. Law enforcement does not disclose how many of the people identified are cleared without charges. The absence of data is not evidence of absence—it is evidence of a reporting gap that makes constitutional analysis harder, not easier.
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The Law Enforcement Case: When Geofence Warrants Work
The constitutional case against geofence warrants is strong. But a complete analysis requires engaging with the government’s strongest arguments for why they matter—and the cases where geofence warrants identified suspects who would otherwise have remained unknown.
The Department of Justice, in its briefing before the Supreme Court, has argued that geofence warrants are “fully consistent with the Constitution” and represent a legitimate investigative tool for cases where traditional methods fail.[13a] The DOJ’s position is that the warrant process—with its judicial oversight and probable cause requirement—provides sufficient constitutional protection, and that requiring individualized probable cause before a geofence warrant would effectively eliminate a valuable technique.
There are documented cases where geofence warrants were essential to solving serious crimes. In several armed robbery investigations, geofence warrants identified suspects when no witnesses, fingerprints, or surveillance footage were available.[13b] In homicide cold cases, location data from geofence warrants provided the only lead after years of investigative dead ends. The investigation into the January 6, 2021 Capitol riot demonstrated the technique’s utility at scale: law enforcement used geofence warrants to identify individuals present at the Capitol, then cross-referenced location data with social media activity and financial records to identify and prosecute defendants.[13c] A Virginia court, in United States v. Price, praised investigators for drafting a geofence warrant that was “a model of particularity in geographic scope and time period” that minimized “the potential for capturing location data for uninvolved individuals”—evidence that geofence warrants can be drafted with particularity when law enforcement takes care.[13d] The practical question is not whether geofence warrants can identify the guilty—they clearly can—but whether the constitutional cost of searching millions of innocent people to find one suspect is justified by the result.
The empirical picture is incomplete, which is itself part of the problem. Google does not systematically disclose how many geofence warrants lead to arrests or convictions. Law enforcement agencies do not track outcomes. What data exists comes from court records in individual cases—useful for anecdotes, insufficient for systematic assessment. The DOJ claims the technique is effective; civil liberties organizations document the harms to innocent bystanders. Both may be right.
This is the tradeoff the Supreme Court must weigh: a technique that can solve crimes when nothing else works, deployed at a scale that searches millions of people who have done nothing wrong. Framing this as a binary choice—either geofence warrants are constitutional or they’re not—obscures the harder question: what constitutional framework can preserve the legitimate investigative value while preventing the constitutional harm? The Harvard Law Review’s analysis, discussed below, suggests that existing doctrine may not provide one.
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No Statutory Limits
There is no federal statute governing geofence warrants.[14] The entire regulatory framework consists of Fourth Amendment case law, which—as the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have demonstrated—cannot even produce consistent answers to the most basic question of whether geofence warrants constitute a search.
State-level protections are patchwork and incomplete:
– California requires a judicial finding that alternative investigative methods have been exhausted or are insufficient before a geofence warrant can be issued.[15] This is the most protective state standard, but it applies only in California and only to state-level investigations. – Massachusetts requires notice to all Google users within the geofence—a requirement that is practically impossible to implement when the geofence covers hundreds or thousands of devices.[16] – Colorado, New Hampshire, and New York have enacted stricter requirements for geofence warrants, but the specifics vary and the protections are limited to state investigations.[17] – Most states have no specific legislation addressing geofence warrants at all, leaving the question entirely to constitutional interpretation.
The patchwork nature of state protections creates a constitutional disparity that the Supreme Court may find untenable. A person standing in Richmond, Virginia (Fourth Circuit) has no constitutional protection against geofence warrants. The same person standing in New Orleans, Louisiana (Fifth Circuit) does. That the Fourth Amendment means different things depending on which side of a state line you happen to be standing on is a problem the Supreme Court was designed to solve.
The Congressional Research Service, in its analysis of reverse warrants, identified this statutory vacuum as a significant policy concern. “No federal statute governs geofence warrants,” the CRS report noted. The regulatory framework relies “entirely on Fourth Amendment case law”—the same case law that produced the “Grand Canyon” circuit split.[18]
Members of Congress have taken notice. In 2022, several senators sent a letter to Google warning about the potential use of geofence warrants in abortion investigations and asking the company to minimize its data collection practices.[19] But no federal legislation has been introduced, and the prospects for statutory reform in a divided Congress are uncertain at best.
The Samuelson-Glushko Technology Law and Policy Clinic at the University of Colorado Law School, at the request of the Center for Democracy and Technology, has developed a model policy framework that states could adopt to regulate geofence warrants.[19a] The framework includes provisions for reporting requirements (so that the public can assess how often geofence warrants are used and how many innocent people are swept up), scope limitations (geographic and temporal maximums), and exhaustion requirements (mandating that traditional investigative methods be tried first). The clinic’s director, Vivek Krishnamurthy, has argued that “geofence searches should be regulated by statutory law” rather than left to constitutional interpretation alone—precisely because constitutional doctrine has produced the circuit split that the Supreme Court must now resolve.
The model framework anticipates the technological shift that Google’s 2023 policy change represents. As Krishnamurthy noted, “law enforcement will likely pivot to other data sources—mobile carriers, app developers, and data brokers—when issuing geofence warrants.”[19b] A constitutional ruling that applies only to Google’s Sensorvault would be obsolete before the ink dries. A statutory framework that applies to any large database of location records would be durable regardless of which company holds the data.
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The Scope Problem: No Limits on the Net
Even within the constitutional framework, geofence warrants have no inherent limit on their scope. The geographic area covered by a geofence can be as large or as small as law enforcement requests. The time window can span minutes or days. There is no statutory limit on either dimension.[20]
In practice, the scope of geofence warrants varies enormously. Some cover a small area (a single building) for a short time (minutes). Others cover entire neighborhoods for hours. The broader the geofence, the more innocent people are swept up in Step 1. But because there is no statutory standard for what constitutes an unconstitutionally broad geofence, the question is left entirely to judicial discretion—on a warrant-by-warrant basis, with no guidance from statute or Supreme Court precedent.
The Fifth Circuit’s categorical holding—that geofence warrants are per se unconstitutional—represents one response to this regulatory vacuum: if you can’t limit them, ban them. The Fourth Circuit’s approach—allowing them with no particularity requirement beyond the warrant itself—represents another: if you can’t ban them, let the warrant process sort it out.
Neither approach addresses the scale of the problem. 11,554 warrants in a single year, growing at 750 percent annually, with no systematic oversight. That is not a constitutional question—it is a policy failure. But it is a policy failure with constitutional dimensions, because the absence of statutory limits means the Fourth Amendment is the only thing standing between every person near a crime scene and a government search of their location data.
The tradeoff is real. Professor Kerr’s amicus brief proposed a framework that could preserve geofence warrants’ legitimate investigative value while constraining their scope: narrow warrants properly drawn in both time and space, with particularity focused on what the government actually obtains rather than the database searched.[20a] The California model—requiring exhaustion of alternative methods before a geofence warrant can be issued—represents another approach. Neither requires banning geofence warrants entirely; neither gives them a blank check. The question is whether the Constitution itself demands one of these middle-ground approaches, or whether it leaves the question to legislatures.
The question of what happens when the primary tool for limiting that surveillance—Google itself—decides to change its policies is the subject of Part 5.
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Notes
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Google, “Supplemental Information on Geofence Warrants in the United States,” https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/supplemental_information_geofence_warrants_united_states.pdf; see also *United States v. Chatrie*, 107 F.4th 319, 323 (4th Cir. 2024). ↩
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Google Transparency Report data: 982 warrants in 2018, 8,396 in 2019. See Google, “Supplemental Information on Geofence Warrants in the United States”; *Geofence Warrant*, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geofence_warrant. ↩
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Google Transparency Report data: 11,554 geofence warrants in 2020. See Google, “Supplemental Information on Geofence Warrants in the United States.” ↩
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Google 2021 transparency report showed geofence warrants constituted approximately 25% of all law enforcement data requests. See *Geofence Warrant*, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geofence_warrant. ↩
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See *United States v. Chatrie*, 107 F.4th 319, 325 (4th Cir. 2024); see also Congressional Research Service, “Geofence and Keyword Searches: Reverse Warrants and the Fourth Amendment” (LSB11274), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/LSB11274. ↩
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*United States v. Chatrie*, 107 F.4th 319, 325 (4th Cir. 2024). ↩
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Congressional Research Service, “Geofence and Keyword Searches: Reverse Warrants and the Fourth Amendment” (LSB11274), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/LSB11274. ↩
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Cal. Penal Code § 1546.1 (requiring exhaustion of alternative investigative methods before geofence warrant issuance). ↩
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NBC News, “Google Tracked His Bike Ride Past a Burglarized Home. That Made Him a Suspect” (Dec. 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/google-tracked-his-bike-ride-past-burglarized-home-made-him-n1151761; see also *United States v. Chatrie*, Fourth Circuit en banc opinion (documenting innocent bystander cases). ↩
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Knight First Amendment Institute, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, and FIRE, Amicus Brief in *Chatrie v. United States* (Mar. 2, 2026), https://knightcolumbia.org/documents/avogw49zgx; see also Press Statement, “Knight Institute, Reporters Committee, and FIRE Urge Supreme Court to Reject Dragnet Geofence Warrants” (Mar. 2, 2026), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/knight-institute-reporters-committee-and-fire-urge-supreme-court-to-reject-dragnet-geofence-warrants. ↩
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Id. (quoting Will Creeley, FIRE legal director). ↩
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See *United States v. Chatrie*, Fourth Circuit en banc opinion (documenting innocent bystander cases); see also Congressional Research Service, “Geofence and Keyword Searches: Reverse Warrants and the Fourth Amendment” (LSB11274). ↩
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Knight First Amendment Institute et al., Amicus Brief in *Chatrie v. United States* (Mar. 2, 2026) (quoting Mara Gassman, Reporters Committee senior staff attorney). ↩
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Congressional Research Service, “Geofence and Keyword Searches: Reverse Warrants and the Fourth Amendment” (LSB11274) (“No federal statute governing geofence warrants. Relied entirely on Fourth Amendment case law.”). ↩
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Cal. Penal Code § 1546.1. ↩
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See Harvard Law Review, “Much Ado About Geofence Warrants” (Feb. 2025), https://harvardlawreview.org/blog/2025/02/much-ado-about-geofence-warrants/ (discussing Massachusetts notice requirement as “impossible in practice”). ↩
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See Congressional Research Service, “Geofence and Keyword Searches: Reverse Warrants and the Fourth Amendment” (LSB11274) (discussing state-level approaches). ↩
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Id. ↩
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Id. (noting 2022 congressional letter to Google regarding potential geofence warrant use in abortion investigations). ↩
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See generally Amster & Diehl, “Geofence Warrants and the Fourth Amendment,” 74 *Stan. L. Rev.* 385 (2022), https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2022/02/Amster-Diehl-74-Stan.-L.-Rev.-385.pdf (discussing the absence of statutory limits on geofence scope). ↩
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“DOJ Urges Supreme Court to Uphold Legality of Geofence Warrants,” *MSN* (2026), https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/technology/doj-urges-supreme-court-to-uphold-legality-of-geofence-warrants/ar-AA1ZsOVt. ↩
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See, e.g., *United States v. Chatrie*, 107 F.4th 319, 322-23 (4th Cir. 2024) (describing successful identification of robbery suspect through geofence warrant when traditional methods yielded no leads); see also Valerie R. Susla, “Geofence Warrants: The New Frontier in Digital Evidence,” 54 *U. Balt. L. Rev.* 1 (2024) (documenting cases where geofence warrants identified suspects in violent crimes with no other investigative leads). ↩
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See GovFacts, “Geofence Warrants: How Police Use Your Phone’s Location to Solve Crimes,” https://govfacts.org/tech-innovation/digital-rights-privacy/digital-surveillance/geofence-warrants-how-police-use-your-phones-location-to-solve-crimes/ (documenting use of geofence warrants to identify January 6 Capitol riot participants through cross-referencing of location data with social media and financial records). ↩
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*United States v. Price*, No. 1:22-cr-00133 (E.D. Va. 2023) (denying motion to suppress geofence warrant evidence, praising the warrant as “a model of particularity in geographic scope and time period”); see also Lexipol, “Emerging Tech and Law Enforcement: Geofences,” https://www.lexipol.com/resources/blog/emerging-tech-and-law-enforcement-what-are-geofences-and-how-do-they-work/. ↩
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Vivek Krishnamurthy, “A Model Framework for Regulating Geofence Warrants,” *Tech Policy Press* (June 9, 2025), https://www.techpolicy.press/a-model-framework-for-regulating-geofence-warrants/; see also Samuelson-Glushko Technology Law and Policy Clinic, University of Colorado Law School, model policy framework for geofence warrant regulation, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5283732. ↩
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Id. (noting that law enforcement will “pivot to other data sources” as Google decentralizes location data). ↩
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Brief of Professor Orin S. Kerr as Amicus Curiae in *Chatrie v. United States*, No. 25-112 (U.S. Apr. 1, 2026), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-112/403349/20260401133909957_25-112acProfessorOrinSKerr.pdf (arguing that “a properly drawn geofence warrant can satisfy the Fourth Amendment” and that particularity should focus on what the government actually obtains, not the database searched). ↩