Geofence Warrants – Part 2: The Chatrie Case
A Virginia credit union was robbed. Police had no suspect—so they asked Google to find one. What followed was a constitutional journey through three levels of federal courts, producing a decision so fractured that 14 judges couldn’t agree on why they agreed.
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On an August day in 2019, a man robbed the Navy Federal Credit Union in Richmond, Virginia.[1] He used a burner phone. He left no fingerprints. The investigators had few leads and fewer options. So they did what hundreds of law enforcement agencies across the country had learned to do: they went to Google.
The geofence warrant they obtained covered a two-hour window around the robbery and the geographic area surrounding the credit union.[2] Google searched Sensorvault—its database of location histories from hundreds of millions of devices—and returned a list of every device that had been in the area during that time. From that list, investigators narrowed their focus to devices whose movement patterns matched the behavior of someone leaving the scene of a robbery. One device stood out. Google identified its owner.
His name was Okello Chatrie.[3]
The geofence warrant had done exactly what it was designed to do: identify an unknown suspect from a pool of everyone near a crime scene. But Chatrie’s case would become the vehicle for the most important Fourth Amendment question the Supreme Court has faced in a decade—because the constitutional problem with how he was identified is inseparable from the technology that identified him.
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The District Court: Suppression
Chatrie moved to suppress the geofence warrant evidence, arguing that the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement and constituted an unconstitutional general warrant.[4] The district court agreed.
The Eastern District of Virginia held that the geofence warrant “lack[ed] particularized probable cause as to every Google user in the geofence.”[5] The logic was straightforward: the Fourth Amendment requires that warrants describe with particularity the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. A geofence warrant, by its very nature, searches everyone in a geographic area and then identifies a suspect from the results. The warrant described the place (the area around the credit union) and the time (two hours), but it could not describe the person to be seized—because the person was unknown.
This, the district court concluded, was precisely the kind of “general warrant” that the Fourth Amendment was enacted to prohibit. The Framers had lived through British colonial authorities using writs of assistance—general warrants that allowed officials to search any place and seize any person without particularized suspicion. The Fourth Amendment was the constitutional response to that practice. A warrant that searches everyone in an area and then identifies a suspect from the data was, the court held, a digital writ of assistance.[6]
The district court’s analysis went beyond the particularity requirement alone. It held that the geofence warrant was not merely deficient in its description—it was constitutionally defective in its structure. The three-step process—in which the government first searches everyone, then narrows its focus, then de-anonymizes specific individuals—was the antithesis of what the Fourth Amendment requires. The Amendment demands that the government identify who it’s searching before it searches. The geofence warrant searches first and identifies later. That temporal inversion was the constitutional problem: not just that the warrant was imprecise, but that it reversed the order the Fourth Amendment requires.
The government appealed. What happened next produced one of the most unusual appellate decisions in recent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
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The Fourth Circuit En Banc: 14-1, in 126 Pages
The Fourth Circuit granted rehearing en banc—meaning the full court, rather than a three-judge panel, would decide the case.[7] The result was a 14-1 decision affirming the district court’s denial of Chatrie’s suppression motion—but on reasoning that was, to put it charitably, contested.
The court issued a one-sentence per curiam opinion affirming the district court’s result.[8] Then came nine separate concurring and dissenting opinions, totaling 126 pages, in which the judges disagreed about virtually everything except the outcome.[9] The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL), summarizing the decision, described it as “a single-sentence per curiam opinion, followed by nine concurrences and dissents, totaling 126 pages.”[10]
This is not how appellate courts normally operate. A per curiam opinion is typically reserved for cases where the result is so obvious that extended reasoning is unnecessary. A 14-1 vote suggests overwhelming consensus. But 126 pages of separate opinions—nine different judges explaining their reasoning—suggests a court that agreed on the outcome while fundamentally disagreeing on the constitutional logic.
The concurring opinions illustrate the range of disagreement. Some judges relied entirely on the third-party doctrine—if you share data with Google, you assume the risk. Others focused on the limited temporal scope: two hours of location data, they reasoned, is not the “detailed, encyclopedic” record that Carpenter protected. Still others emphasized the warrant process itself: a judge approved the warrant, probable cause existed for the geographic area, and the judicial oversight provided sufficient constitutional protection regardless of the particularity question. One concurrence suggested that even if the geofence warrant were unconstitutional, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule would apply because the legal question was novel enough that law enforcement acted reasonably.[8a]
The practical result was that geofence warrants survived in the Fourth Circuit. The holding is unambiguous: geofence warrants are constitutional under current Fourth Amendment doctrine. But the reasoning supporting that holding is divided—fractured reasoning is not the same as uncertain law. Lower courts in the Fourth Circuit received a clear answer (geofence warrants are constitutional) without clear guidance on why—a distinction that matters when the same question reaches the Supreme Court.
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The Majority Reasoning: Voluntary Disclosure
The plurality of the Fourth Circuit en banc reached its conclusion through the third-party doctrine—the principle, established in Smith v. Maryland (1979) and United States v. Miller (1976), that when an individual voluntarily conveys information to a third party, they lose any reasonable expectation of privacy in that information.[11]
Writing for the plurality, Judge Richardson held that Chatrie had no Fourth Amendment interest in his location data because he had “volunteered” it to Google by enabling Location History on his phone.[12] The geofence warrant, therefore, did not constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment at all—at least not when limited to two hours of location data. If there was no search, there was no Fourth Amendment problem.
The plurality distinguished Carpenter v. United States (2018), where the Supreme Court held that cell-site location information (CSLI) is protected by the Fourth Amendment, on the ground that CSLI is collected passively by cell phone companies without user control, while Location History data is actively enabled by users who opt into Google’s services.[13] In the plurality’s view, the voluntary nature of Location History data placed it outside Carpenter‘s protection and back within the traditional third-party doctrine from Smith v. Maryland.
This reasoning, however, sits uncomfortably with the current trajectory of Fourth Amendment law. Carpenter itself recognized an exception to the third-party doctrine for sensitive digital data, holding that “the Government’s acquisition of [CSLI] constitutes a Fourth Amendment search” despite the data being held by a third party.[13a] Justice Thomas, concurring in Carpenter, argued that the third-party doctrine should be reconsidered entirely, calling it “inconsistent with original meaning.”[13b] Justice Gorsuch’s dissent suggested that property-based approaches might better protect digital data than the Katz reasonable-expectation framework.[13c] The doctrine the Fourth Circuit plurality relied on is not settled law—it is a rule under active pressure from multiple directions on the Court.
The plurality also characterized the geofence warrant’s output as a “brief glimpse into [someone’s] whereabouts” unlikely to “offer insight into his habits, routines, and associations,”[14]—a characterization the Fifth Circuit would later explicitly reject.
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The Concurring Opinions: Nine Paths to the Same Destination
The eight concurring judges reached the same outcome—upholding the geofence warrant—but through different reasoning. Some relied on the third-party doctrine. Others emphasized the limited time window. Still others found that the warrant process itself, with its judicial oversight, provided sufficient constitutional protection regardless of the particularity question.[15]
The practical effect of the fractured concurrences was to leave Fourth Circuit law on geofence warrants with a clear holding but contested reasoning. The one-sentence per curiam affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion, and no single rationale commanded a majority. Lower courts in the Fourth Circuit know the answer—geofence warrants are constitutional—but must choose among nine different explanations of why. The holding controls; the reasoning competes.
This matters because the Constitution’s meaning should not depend on which judge’s reasoning happens to be most persuasive on a given day—but under the doctrine of Marks v. United States (1977), when a fragmented court produces a holding, the narrowest ground supporting it becomes the law. The Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision left lower courts with a holding (constitutional) and a competition among rationales, rather than the paradox of no law at all.
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The Dissent: “Near Perfect Surveillance at Society Level”
The single dissenting judge saw the problem the majority refused to confront. In a dissent that the Fifth Circuit would later cite extensively, the dissenting judge described geofence warrants as enabling “near perfect surveillance at society level”[16]—a characterization that captured the structural concern more precisely than any of the concurrences.
The dissent argued that the third-party doctrine, as applied to geofence warrants, fails to account for the realities of modern digital life. A cell phone with location tracking is not optional—it is, in Chief Justice Roberts’s phrase, “a feature of human anatomy.”[17] When “opting in” to location tracking is a practical necessity of participating in modern society, calling it “voluntary disclosure” empties the Fourth Amendment of meaning.
This argument resonates beyond the Fourth Circuit. Carpenter already limited the third-party doctrine’s reach for sensitive digital records. Scholars including Professor Orin Kerr have argued that the doctrine is in “doctrinal decline”—surviving as a formal rule but increasingly unable to account for the reality that modern life requires sharing enormous quantities of personal data with third parties simply to function.[17a] The dissent’s critique of the third-party doctrine is not an outlier—it tracks where multiple members of the Supreme Court have signaled the law may be heading.
More fundamentally, the dissent argued that geofence warrants are the digital equivalent of the general warrants that the Fourth Amendment was specifically enacted to prohibit. The Framers knew what it meant for government agents to search everyone in an area without particularized suspicion—they had lived through it. The geofence warrant’s three-step process—search everyone, identify suspects, de-anonymize—is structurally identical to the writs of assistance that sparked the American Revolution, just executed in milliseconds rather than hours.[18]
The dissent’s reasoning would prove prophetic. Weeks later, the Fifth Circuit would adopt it wholesale.
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From the Fourth Circuit to the Supreme Court
The procedural path from the Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision to the Supreme Court was neither quick nor straightforward. Chatrie petitioned for certiorari in 2025, arguing that the circuit split on geofence warrants presented a question of “exceptional importance” that only the Supreme Court could resolve. The government initially opposed certiorari, arguing that the case presented a fact-bound dispute that did not warrant the Court’s attention.
The Court saw it differently. On January 16, 2026, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Chatrie v. United States (Docket 25-112), limited to the question of whether geofence warrants satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. The grant signaled that at least four Justices believed the question was significant enough to warrant review—a threshold that the circuit split and the 11,500+ warrants per year made easy to satisfy.
The Court set argument for April 27, 2026—an unusually rapid timeline that suggests the Court recognized the urgency of the question. Between certiorari and argument, the amicus briefs flooded in—more than a dozen, spanning the ideological spectrum—underscoring that the case presents not just a technical Fourth Amendment question but a fundamental question about the constitutional limits of mass digital surveillance.
The question the Court will answer is the one the Fourth Circuit couldn’t resolve: when the government searches a database containing the location histories of hundreds of millions of people, without knowing who it’s looking for, is that a Fourth Amendment search?
The Fourth Circuit said no—because users “voluntarily” shared their data with Google. The Fifth Circuit said yes—because “voluntary” disclosure of location data to a phone company is not truly voluntary in an era when carrying a phone is practically mandatory.
The Supreme Court’s answer will determine whether geofence warrants can continue, whether they require individualized probable cause, or whether they are categorically unconstitutional as modern-day general warrants. But to understand why the circuits split so dramatically—and why existing Fourth Amendment doctrine may be insufficient to resolve the split—it’s necessary to examine the competing frameworks in detail. That is the story of Part 3.
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Notes
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*United States v. Chatrie*, No. 3:19-cr-130 (E.D. Va. 2019). See *United States v. Chatrie*, 107 F.4th 319, 322-23 (4th Cir. 2024) (describing robbery of Navy Federal Credit Union in Richmond, Virginia). ↩
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*United States v. Chatrie*, 107 F.4th 319, 324 (4th Cir. 2024) (describing geofence warrant covering a two-hour window around the robbery). ↩
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Id. at 322-23. ↩
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See *United States v. Chatrie*, No. 3:19-cr-130, Memorandum Opinion (E.D. Va. 2021) (suppressing geofence warrant evidence for lack of particularized probable cause). ↩
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Id. ↩
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Id. (analogizing geofence warrants to general warrants prohibited by the Fourth Amendment). ↩
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*United States v. Chatrie*, 107 F.4th 319 (4th Cir. 2024) (en banc). ↩
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*United States v. Chatrie*, 107 F.4th 319 (4th Cir. 2024) (en banc per curiam). The Fourth Circuit en banc opinion is available at https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/224489.P.pdf and https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-ca4-22-04489/pdf/USCOURTS-ca4-22-04489-0.pdf. ↩
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NACDL, “United States v. Chatrie,” https://www.nacdl.org/Content/United-States-v-Chatrie,-No-3-19-cr-130-(E-D-Va-) (describing “a single-sentence per curiam opinion, followed by nine concurrences and dissents, totaling 126 pages”). ↩
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Id. ↩
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*Smith v. Maryland*, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that numbers dialed on a phone are not protected because voluntarily disclosed to the phone company); *United States v. Miller*, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (holding that bank records are not protected because voluntarily conveyed to the bank). ↩
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*United States v. Chatrie*, 107 F.4th 319, 338-40 (4th Cir. 2024) (plurality opinion of Richardson, J.) (“Just like in [Smith and Miller], Chatrie volunteered incriminating information about himself to a third party.”). ↩
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*Carpenter v. United States*, 585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (holding that CSLI is protected by the Fourth Amendment because collected passively without user control). ↩
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*United States v. Chatrie*, 107 F.4th 319, 345 (4th Cir. 2024) (characterizing geofence output as a “brief glimpse” unlikely to reveal habits, routines, and associations). ↩
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*United States v. Chatrie*, 107 F.4th 319 (4th Cir. 2024) (en banc, with 8 concurring opinions applying varying rationales). ↩
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*United States v. Chatrie*, 107 F.4th 319 (4th Cir. 2024) (dissenting opinion, describing geofence warrants as enabling “near perfect surveillance at society level”); see also *United States v. Smith*, 110 F.4th 817, 828 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing the Chatrie dissent’s “near perfect surveillance” characterization with approval). ↩
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*Riley v. California*, 573 U.S. 373, 395 (2014). ↩
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See generally Stanford Law Review, Amster & Diehl, “Geofence Warrants and the Fourth Amendment,” 74 *Stan. L. Rev.* 385 (2022), https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2022/02/Amster-Diehl-74-Stan.-L.-Rev.-385.pdf (analyzing the analogy between geofence warrants and general warrants); *Marks v. United States*, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (holding that when a fragmented court produces a holding, the narrowest ground supporting it becomes controlling law). ↩
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*United States v. Chatrie*, 107 F.4th 319 (4th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (several concurring opinions applying varying rationales, including third-party doctrine, temporal scope, and good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule). ↩
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*Carpenter*, 138 S. Ct. at 2213 (recognizing an exception to the third-party doctrine for cell-site location information as “detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled” records of physical movements). ↩
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*Carpenter*, 138 S. Ct. at 2262 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the third-party doctrine is “inconsistent with original meaning” and should be reconsidered). ↩
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*Carpenter*, 138 S. Ct. at 2273 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (suggesting property-based approaches may better protect digital data than the *Katz* reasonable-expectation framework). ↩
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Orin Kerr, “The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: The Doctrine of Decline,” in *The Cambridge Companion to the Fourth Amendment* (2024); see also Orin Kerr, “Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Law,” 10 *Ohio St. J. Crim. L.* 257 (2012) (arguing that the third-party doctrine is increasingly difficult to reconcile with the realities of digital life). ↩