The Enemy of My Enemy’s Enemy: 1953’s Conditions in 2026
Part 5 of “Crossing the 33rd Parallel” — What 73 years of intervention created, and what might come next.
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What the past created
In 2026, the United States and Israel are conducting military strikes against Iranian targets. We don’t yet know what consequences these will produce. But we can see what 1953 created:
Conditions for anti-Americanism:
The 1953 coup created a narrative: the United States overthrows governments it doesn’t like. That narrative was mobilized by: – Khomeini to justify the Islamic Republic[1] – Hostage takers to justify the embassy seizure[2] – Iranian leaders to justify hostility toward the US[3]
The 1979 hostage crisis institutionalized that hostility. Americans saw Iranians as enemies. Iranians saw Americans as hostile.
Conditions for Iranian foreign policy:
Iran’s foreign policy has consistent elements since 1979: – Opposition to US influence in the Middle East – Support for groups that oppose Israel (Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis) – Pursuit of nuclear capability – Regional influence as a goal[4]
These positions aren’t simply responses to US hostility. They reflect Iranian choices within the conditions created by 1953, 1979, and subsequent US policy.
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What the US wanted
US goals, 1953-2026:
| Period | Primary Goal | Strategy | |——–|————–|———-| | 1953-1979 | Contain Soviet influence, protect oil | Support Shah | | 1979-1988 | Contain Iran, support Iraq in war | Proxy conflict | | 1988-2001 | Contain Iran, maintain regional order | Sanctions, dual containment | | 2001-2015 | Prevent nuclear Iran, counter terrorism | Sanctions, threat of force | | 2015-2018 | Prevent nuclear Iran through diplomacy | JCPOA | | 2018-2025 | Prevent nuclear Iran through pressure | Maximum pressure, sanctions | | 2025- | Prevent nuclear Iran, counter proxies | Direct strikes, sanctions[5] |
What the US got:
– A regional adversary with significant influence – Decades of hostility – Nuclear program (not achieved, but advanced) – Proxy networks opposing US allies – No diplomatic resolution
What Iranians got:
– A government many didn’t choose – Decades of sanctions and isolation – Regional influence and proxy networks – Nuclear capability (limited) – A narrative of resistance to US intervention
Both sides got some of what they wanted, and consequences they didn’t want.
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Moments of rapprochement
The US and Iran haven’t been continuously hostile since 1953. There were moments when different choices were possible:
Iran-Contra (1985-1986): – The US sold weapons to Iran to fund Nicaraguan contras – Israel facilitated the transfers – Iranian officials sought weapons primarily to influence hostage negotiations; the war effort was a secondary motivation[6]
Post-9/11 intelligence (2001-2002): – Iran offered intelligence about Afghanistan – Iranian officials cooperated against the Taliban – Bush’s “axis of evil” speech (January 2002) ended the cooperation[7]
Khatami reform period (1997-2005): – President Khatami sought dialogue with the West – Cultural exchanges, limited diplomacy – Hardliners in both countries opposed engagement – The Bush administration didn’t pursue it[8]
JCPOA negotiations (2013-2015): – Iran agreed to nuclear limits in exchange for sanctions relief – US, EU, China, Russia all parties to the agreement – It limited Iran’s nuclear program for several years – Trump withdrew in 2018[9]
Green Movement (2009): – Iranians demonstrated for democratic reform – The US didn’t support the movement – Reformers were suppressed – Hardliners consolidated power
Each moment offered possibilities. Iranian and American choices — and failures to choose — shaped what happened next.
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What might come next
In 2026, direct US-Israel military strikes on Iranian targets are creating new conditions. We don’t yet know what Iranians will do with those conditions.
Historical patterns suggest:
– Intervention creates narratives: Iranians can claim the US is attacking them – Repression creates organization: Attacks may strengthen hardliners who claim the government protects them – Economic pressure creates discontent: Sanctions hurt ordinary Iranians, but who they blame is unclear – Military action creates uncertainty: We don’t know what Iranian leaders will choose
What we don’t know:
– Will Iranian leaders escalate or de-escalate? – Will Iranian population support the government or oppose it? – Will regional allies support US policy or distance themselves? – Will Russia and China support Iran more if US pressure increases?
What history suggests:
Intervention creates conditions, but Iranians choose what to do with them. The 1953 coup created conditions that Iranian actors mobilized for seventy years. Those conditions didn’t determine outcomes — Iranians made choices.
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What Americans can learn
Pattern recognition:
| Year | Intervention | Conditions created | What Iranians did | |——|————–|——————-|——————| | 1953 | Coup | Discredited liberals, anti-US narrative | Mobilized by Khomeini, clerics | | 1979 | Support for Shah | Collapse revealed weaknesses | Iranian revolution | | 1980s | Support for Iraq | War strengthened regime | Regime consolidation | | 2015-2018 | JCPOA then withdrawal | Undermined moderates | Hardliners strengthened | | 2025- | Direct strikes | Unknown | Unknown |
What this suggests:
Intervention has consequences, but those consequences depend on Iranian choices. Sometimes intervention produces what interveners want. Sometimes it produces what they didn’t expect.
What it doesn’t predict:
We don’t know if 2026 strikes will produce: – Iranian regime collapse (possible) – Iranian regime consolidation (possible) – Regional war (possible) – Diplomatic resolution (possible)
History doesn’t determine outcomes. It creates conditions. People choose.
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What Iranians can learn
The Islamic Republic has ruled since 1979. It has: – Survived sanctions, war, and isolation – Maintained domestic support among some Iranians – Built regional influence – Advanced nuclear capability[10]
It has also: – Imposed theocratic rule on Iranians who didn’t choose it – Created economic hardship through isolation and mismanagement – Fought proxy wars that cost Iranian lives – Produced emigration, brain drain, and discontent[11]
Iranians have choices:
– Support the regime – Oppose the regime – Emigrate – Adapt and survive
Iranians made choices in 1906, 1953, 1979, and every year since. They make choices now.
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What neither side controls
US policy toward Iran reflects American goals, domestic politics, and assumptions about Iranians. Iranian policy toward the US reflects Iranian goals, domestic politics, and assumptions about Americans.
Neither side fully controls outcomes. Both create conditions that the other responds to.
The pattern since 1953:
– US intervention → Iranian response → US response → Iranian response – Iranian action → US response → Iranian response → US response
Each iteration creates conditions for the next. None of the participants can fully predict what choices others will make.
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The question for 2026
In 1953, the United States chose intervention rather than negotiation.
In 1979, Iranians chose revolution rather than reform.
In subsequent decades, both sides chose hostility rather than engagement.
In 2026, both sides are making choices that create conditions.
The US and Israel are conducting military strikes. Iran is responding. What choices will follow?
– American choices: Continue strikes? Negotiate? Escalate? Withdraw? – Iranian choices: Escalate? De-escalate? Seek diplomatic resolution? Build nuclear weapon? – Regional choices: Support US? Support Iran? Distance from both? – International choices: Mediate? Support one side? Stay out?
What 1953 created:
A narrative of American intervention that Iranian leaders have mobilized for seventy years. Conditions of hostility that both sides have maintained.
What Iranians chose to do with those conditions:
Supported theocratic government, opposed US influence, built regional networks, pursued nuclear capability. Some emigrated. Some adapted. Some oppose their government.
What Americans chose to do with those conditions:
Supported the Shah, then opposed the Islamic Republic, then tried diplomacy, then withdrew, then imposed sanctions, then conducted military strikes.
What might come next:
We don’t know. Intervention creates conditions. Iranians choose what to do with them.
The question is: what conditions are we creating now, and what might Iranians do with them?
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Notes
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Crossing the 33rd Parallel: How intervention creates conditions
[Part 1: The Democratic Experiment] — What Iranians built before the coup
[Part 2: Operation Ajax] — The mechanics of intervention
[Part 3: How Autocracies Fall] — The Shah’s 26-year reign
[Part 4: The Revolution That Ate Its Children] — Why the Shah collapsed, why Khomeini rose
Part 5: The Enemy of My Enemy’s Enemy — You are here
Series Navigation
Crossing the 33rd Parallel: How intervention shapes consequences
Part 1: The Democratic Experiment — What Iranians built before the coup
Part 2: Operation Ajax — The coup, the collaborators, the consequences
Part 3: How Autocracies Fall — The Shah’s 26-year reign
Part 4: The Revolution That Ate Its Children — Why the Shah collapsed, why Khomeini rose
Part 5: The Enemy of My Enemy’s Enemy — You are here
Notes
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Khomeini, Ruhollah. *Islamic Government.* 1970. Translated Hamid Algar. ↩
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Harris, David. *The Crisis: The President, the Prophet, and the Shah.* Little, Brown, 2004. ↩
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Takeyh, Ray. *The Guardian of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Cold War.* Oxford University Press, 2009. ↩
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Moshirzadeh, Homeira. “Discursive Foundations of Iran’s Nuclear Policy.” *Security Studies* 18, no. 3 (2009): 521-561. ↩
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Pollack, Kenneth M. *The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America.* Random House, 2004. ↩
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Byrne, Malcolm. *Iran-Contra: Reagan’s Scandal and the Unchecked Abuse of Presidential Power.* Knopf, 2014. ↩
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Takeyh, Ray. *Guardian of the Revolution*, pp. 200-220. ↩
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Sadegh, Mohammad. “Khatami’s Dialogue Among Civilizations.” *Iranian Studies* 32, no. 1 (1999): 5-15. ↩
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Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Vienna, July 14, 2015. ↩
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International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Reports on Iran’s nuclear program, 2003-2025. ↩
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Salehi-Isfahani, Djavad. “Poverty, Inequality, and Political Mobilization in Iran.” *Economic Research Forum Working Paper* 700 (2012).
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